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Abstract 
Attempts to ‘naturalize’ phenomenology challenge both traditional phenomenology and traditional 
approaches to cognitive science. They challenge Edmund Husserl’s rejection of naturalism and his 
attempt to establish phenomenology as a foundational transcendental discipline, and they challenge 
efforts to explain cognition through mainstream science. While appearing to be a retreat from the bold 
claims made for phenomenology, it is really its triumph. Naturalized phenomenology is spearheading a 
successful challenge to the heritage of Cartesian dualism. This converges with the reaction against 
Cartesian thought within science itself. Descartes divided the universe between res cogitans, thinking 
substances, and res extensa, the mechanical world. The latter won with Newton and we have, in most of 
objective science since, literally lost our mind, hence our humanity. Despite Darwin, biologists remain 
children of Newton, and dream of a grand theory that is epistemologically complete and would allow 
lawful entailment of the evolution of the biosphere. This dream is no longer tenable. We now have to 
recognize that science and scientists are within and part of the world we are striving to comprehend, as 
proponents of endophysics have argued, and that physics, biology and mathematics have to be 
reconceived accordingly. Interpreting quantum mechanics from this perspective is shown to both 
illuminate conscious experience and reveal new paths for its further development. In biology we must 
now justify the use of the word “function”. As we shall see, we cannot prestate the ever new biological 
functions that arise and constitute the very phase space of evolution. Hence, we cannot mathematize the 
detailed becoming of the biosphere, nor write differential equations for functional variables we do not 
know ahead of time, nor integrate those equations, so no laws “entail” evolution. The dream of a grand 
theory fails. In place of entailing laws, a post-entailing law explanatory framework is proposed in which 
Actuals arise in evolution that constitute new boundary conditions that are enabling constraints that create 
new, typically unprestatable, Adjacent Possible opportunities for further evolution, in which new Actuals 
arise, in a persistent becoming. Evolution flows into a typically unprestatable succession of Adjacent 
Possibles. Given the concept of function, the concept of functional closure of an organism making a living 
in its world, becomes central.  Implications for patterns in evolution include historical reconstruction, and 
statistical laws such as the distribution of extinction events, or species per genus, and the use of formal 
cause, not efficient cause, laws.  
Key Words:  Phenomenology; endophysics; quantum mechanics; measurement; functional closure; 
adjacent possibles; enabling constraints; purposeless teleology; statistical laws 
 
 
 
 
Recent efforts to naturalize phenomenology have both opened new directions in cognitive science and 
revived interest in phenomenology. While inspiring major work in the area, this revival raises questions 
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about what is phenomenology, whether phenomenology can be naturalized, and what is the significance 
of a naturalized phenomenology. Edmund Husserl, the founder of the phenomenology movement, was 
clearly hostile to naturalistic approaches to consciousness, logic and mathematics. As he wrote in 
‘Philosophy as a Rigorous Science’, criticizing Ernst Häckel and Wilhelm Ostwald in particular:  
Characteristic of all forms of extreme and consistent naturalism, from popular naturalism to the most recent 
forms of sensation-monism and energism, is on one hand the naturalizing of consciousness, including all 
intentionally immanent data of consciousness, and on the other the naturalizing of ideas and consequently of all 
absolute ideals and norms. From the latter point of view, without realizing it, naturalism refutes itself’ 
(Husserl, 1965, 80).  
For Husserl, the naturalistic attitude was something that had to be accounted for from a transcendental 
perspective. As he put it in one of his most important series of lectures, Cartesian Meditations: 
Natural being is a realm whose existential status [Seinsgeltung] is secondary; it continually presupposes the 
realm of transcendental being …. The Objective world, the world that exists for me, that always has and 
always will exist for me, the only world that ever can exist for me – this world, with all its Objects … derives 
its whole sense and its existential status, which it has from me, from me myself, from me as the transcendental 
Ego’ (Husserl, 1973, 21, 26). 
This rigorous form of Idealism, arrived at in part through radicalizing Descartes method to arrive at the 
transcendental ego as the foundation and starting point for all philosophy, provoked a reaction. A branch 
of the phenomenological movement inspired by Husserl rejected his Idealism and developed a profound 
critique of Cartesian dualism. They rejected Descartes’ claim that mind, res cogitans, and matter, res 
extensa, are totally different kinds of being. Those taking this path concluded that consciousness is socio-
historically situated and incarnate, part of and participating in nature, and both consciousness and nature 
must be reconceived accordingly.   
The development of endophysics has also challenged Cartesian dualism, but from the opposite 
direction. As articulated by Max Planck, objectivity in physics involves ‘the complete separation of the 
world from the individuality of the structuring mind; i.e. the emancipation of anthropomorphic elements. 
This means: it is the task of physics to build a world which is foreign to consciousness and in which 
consciousness is obliterated’ (H. Bergman, quoted by Rosen, 1999, 82). Biologists embraced this idea of 
science and sought to explain life in terms of chemistry and physics. The consensus view was summed up 
in the preface to a committee report to the National Academy of Sciences in 1970: ‘Life can be 
understood in terms of the laws that govern and the phenomena that characterize the inanimate, physical 
universe, and indeed, at its essence, life can be understood only in the language of chemistry’ (Philip 
Handler, quoted by Rosen, 1999, 82). This conception of objectivity was underpinned and reinforced by 
conceiving mathematics as totally objective and impersonal. It was this very quest for complete 
objectivity has forced physicists and mathematicians to recognize the necessity of including the observer 
inside this supposedly objective reality of nature and mathematics, both facilitating and limiting what can 
be observed and known. This became evident in relativity theory where the observer’s reference frame 
has to be incorporated into the theory. It also became evident in mathematics where Hilbert’s program of 
reducing mathematics to objectively describable syntactical relations foundered on the recognition that 
what is modeled in this way is always more than the model is able to prove. However, it was quantum 
theory that brought home most completely the inescapability of acknowledging that the observer is part of 
what is being observed. As David Finkelstein, who coined the term ‘endophysics’ put it: ‘In quantum 
theory, physics at last recovers from Descartes’ fever. Its Nature cannot be completely described. Its 
language does not picture being but records deeds, including input-output operations that we have done’ 
(Finkelstein, 1993, 5).  
   It is the convergence of post-Idealist phenomenological philosophy and post-reductionist science that 
has enabled researchers to link the two together to develop a post-Cartesian conception of cognition. 
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However, this is only a starting point, bringing into sharp focus the problems and challenges that lie ahead 
in acknowledging that nature is not merely a mental or cultural construct but has engendered mental and 
cultural constructs, requiring the development of a conception of nature that does not commit its 
adherents to explaining away the reality of life, mind and culture. Addressing these problems and 
embracing these challenges should illuminate all aspects of biology, both in terms of what it is being 
investigated and how life should be examined and understood. This should open up new questions about 
what consciousness is, what is scientific inquiry, what it is to understand anything, what mathematics is, 
what is its relation to physical existence, life, sentience and consciousness, and what its role should be in 
scientific inquiry and explanation. A start can be made in this by examining the confluence engendered by 
the logical unfolding of inquiry that drove phenomenologists to embrace naturalism and drove scientists 
and mathematicians to endophysics, and the insights generated by this confluence, revealing the 
assumptions that have to be overcome and what new paths are opened up by transcending these 
assumptions.  
From Transcendendal Phenomenology to Naturalized Phenomenology 
While transcendental phenomenology is one of the most rigorously formulated Idealisms ever 
developed, characterizing it, and then showing why phenomenologists rejected it and came to embrace 
naturalism, is anything but simple. Husserl attempted to clarify what he meant by phenomenology in his 
essays, and the sequence of essays reveal the trajectory of his thought. However, there were a number of 
strands to his thought. Originally he was more aligned with realism than Idealism, and many of his 
followers never embraced Idealism, rejecting his transcendental turn and developing their own original 
approaches to phenomenology. While Husserl criticized these, he himself was influenced by their work, 
an influence manifest in his late interest in the historicity of human subjectivity and the life-world. To 
fully understand what is at issue in the opposition between Idealism and naturalism in phenomenology, 
and the significance of this for developing a post-Cartesian, post-Newtonian naturalism, it is necessary to 
understand the original ambition of Husserl in developing phenomenology. 
Husserl was originally a mathematician who turned to philosophy to account for the certainty, 
absoluteness and universality of mathematics and logic given that these are the products of particular 
human minds, and to oppose a tendency in philosophy towards relativism and skepticism, not only about 
knowledge, but also about ideals. There were two questions that had to be answered by a philosophy of 
mathematics: How do mathematical and logical concepts originate? and then What is the nature of the 
formal patterns within which these concepts function? That is, what is their relation to the world. Husserl 
found the beginnings of the philosophy that he was looking for in the work of the Aristotelian 
philosopher, Franz Brentano. From Brentano he embraced the concept of the intentionality of 
consciousness according to which consciousness is always directed to some ‘object’ that is other than 
consciousness; whether a perceived physical existent or an abstract mathematical concept. Acts of 
consciousness and objects constituted by these acts are inseparable correlates. Whatever these objects are, 
they have an ideational component and are seen in relation to generals and their possibilities and the 
relations between these. Husserl’s first efforts to characterize mathematics were severely criticized by 
Gottlob Frege for confusing cognitive acts and the objects of knowledge; therefore not adequately 
acknowledging the objective nature of logical and mathematical truths. It is these problems that led him to 
study logic as the formal aspect of deductive argument, and as such, the necessary condition for any 
enquiry that claims to be scientific. In Husserl’s first major work, Logical Investigations (1970a), there 
were two avenues of approach to these topics; reflection on psychic life, particularly perception, and 
reflection on logic. Neither of these avenues was ever abandoned. Although perception was always 
investigated in relation to the problem of ideality, to begin with, Husserl assumed it could be investigated 
in the context of belief in the natural world. However, a third avenue into phenomenology was 
investigated, a reflection on self in which belief in the natural world was brought into question and 
transcendental phenomenology, a form of Idealism, defended. This began with the published Ideas and 
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continued with the unpublished Ideas II and Ideas III and was defended in its most extreme form in 
Cartesian Meditations. Then in The Crisis of European Science and Transcendental Phenomenology 
Husserl introduced a fourth avenue into phenomenology - analysis of a primordial ‘life-world’ 
(Lebenswelt) as the foundation and condition of all abstract thinking (Husserl, 1970b). While designed to 
support transcendental phenomenology, it weakened its claim to achieving apodictic (i.e. incontestable 
because demonstrably true) knowledge. 
For Husserl (as for Charles Sanders Peirce, another proponent of phenomenology), phenomenology 
begins with a presuppositionless description of phenomena (although he later saw this as more complex). 
In carrying this out Husserl was concerned to avoid assuming the ‘natural attitude’ according to which 
appearances are of a physical world structured by space, time and causation. He also wanted to make 
explicit the hidden presuppositions concerning reference to the world implicit in the meaning of current 
formal logic, disguised by claiming that the realm of logic is radically distinct from matters of fact (Tito, 
1990, 2f.). Free of such assumptions and presuppositions, it is possible to recognize the descriptively 
valid status of general meanings and a mode of consciousness that directs itself to these general meanings. 
This is what Husserl referred to as the ‘intuition of essences’. The intuition of essences, or ‘the eidetic 
reduction’, involved free imaginative variation of each ‘eidos’ (idea, essence or concept) without radically 
changing the object-meaning; to reveal what elements are necessary to these and thereby to clarify eidetic 
structures. Following this, the essential relation between essences could then be revealed. Husserl’s 
characterization of this intuition of essences reveals the influence on him of his work in mathematics in 
which such imaginative variation is essential to understanding and developing mathematical concepts and 
relations between them, and his notion of the intuition of essences is really a generalization of this to 
grasping the meaning of all objects of experience. The aim of Husserl’s phenomenology, as Ronald 
Bruzina put it, was ‘a presuppositionless clarification of the essential structure of consciousness as 
capable of having essential structures as its object; or, in other words, as eidetic clarification of 
consciousness in all its forms, including its summit activity, grasp of eidetic structures – essence-
intuition’ (Bruzina, 44).  
Transcendental Phenomenology 
In his quest to achieve greater clarification, Husserl in Ideas introduced a further reduction, the 
‘phenomenological reduction’. This involved ‘bracketing’ (epoché) all assumptions concerning both 
transcendental being and physical existence, leaving only pure consciousness with its acts and correlates 
of these acts. A further ‘bracketing’ excluded intentional activities associated directly or indirectly with 
other subjectivities (Husserl, 1982, 60ff., 113). These ‘bracketings’ were designed to reveal a realm of 
primordial transcendence in which only those actual and potential intentionalities remain in which the ego 
is constituted in its proper sphere. For Husserl, this was seen to provide the ultimate foundation from 
which it would be possible to examine the constitution of the empirical subject, other subjects, the 
existing life-word, values and ideal objects such as those of logic, mathematics and the sciences. 
Achieving this, Husserl believed, would make phenomenology into a rigorous science able to explicate 
the possibility of and foundations for all other domains of inquiry; including, logic, mathematics and 
science and the ideals of ethics, showing their limitations and their relations to each other. This is 
phenomenology as transcendental Idealism.  
Many of Husserl’s erstwhile followers not only refused to take the path that led to this transcendental 
Idealism, but offered searching critiques of Husserl’s work and reformulated what they took to be the 
project of phenomenology, in the process making major contributions to phenomenology, philosophy and 
science. Even some of his most loyal interpreters, for instance Alfred Schutz, complained that in the 
development of Husserl’s work ‘the idea of constitution had changed from a clarification of sense-
structure, from an explication of the sense of being, into the foundation of the structure of being; it had 
changed from explication into creation’ (Schutz, 1970, 83). More radical critics rejected the whole idea of 
making philosophy into a rigorous science that would provide apodictic knowledge foundational to every 
other science, arguing in different ways that this is an impossible project (Watkin, 2009, 1-12). The claim 
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to have provided certain knowledge through a presuppositionless description of a realm of pure 
consciousness, it was argued, is marred by presupposing and imposing old concepts and categories on 
experience, deploying the concepts of ego, the subject, and even the notion of consciousness itself, rather 
than examining experience to reveal whether these concepts do have a valid place, and if so, what place.  
While in the case of Jacques Derrida and his epigone, this led to the complete rejection of 
phenomenology; alternatives to the Idealist transcendental form of phenomenology were developed as 
philosophical anthropology, hermeneutic phenomenology and existential phenomenology. While 
deploying Husserl’s phenomenological method, these approaches revived ideas from the past that had 
been sidelined and almost forgotten. To begin with, Friedrich Schelling’s argument that there is an 
unprethinkable being preceding all thought that cannot seriously be doubted was revived by Heidegger to 
reject Husserl’s claim that all claims to existence could be bracketed out. Fichte and Schelling’s argument 
that concepts are developed in practice before they can be reflected upon as concepts was defended by 
Heidegger, and following him by the existentialists, and then by Husserl himself. The argument of Fichte, 
Schelling and Hegel that the ego presupposes other egos was also revived, leading to the rejection of 
Husserl’s effort to account for the constitution of intersubjectivity through the operations of the 
transcendental ego. Intersubjectivity and the ‘we’ relationship are the foundational categories of human 
existence, argued Stephen Strasser (1969) and Schutz, and this was later accepted by Husserl. Husserl 
tried to accommodate these claims in embracing and developing the concept of the life-world, but his 
effort to reveal structures beyond history through transcendental phenomenology was clearly in tension 
with his acknowledgement of the historicity of the life-world. This was seen, even by his defenders, to 
have been unsuccessful (Carr, 1974), and in a fragment, Husserl himself acknowledged his quest for an 
apodictically rigorous scientific philosophy had failed. As he put it, ‘the dream is over’ (Husserl, 1979, 
389). What these developments show is how difficult it is to free oneself from presuppositions when 
examining experience, and how engagement with thinkers, particularly thinkers from the past, can 
facilitate this.  
Such work was not a rejection of Husserl’s philosophy, however, but was a rigorous continuation of 
his phenomenological approach, with the same concern to acknowledge the reality of idealizations in the 
world. Husserl’s transcendental Idealism was questioned and rejected by building on his insights, and 
Husserl himself appears to have moved away from Idealism. Husserl’s work had been embraced because 
it had liberated philosophers from various forms of scientism, whether materialist, positivist or neo-
Kantian, bringing into question the assumptions and categories of mainstream science that had come to 
dominate people’s understanding of the world and themselves. His slogan ‘back to things themselves’, 
extending William James’ radical empiricism, and his revival of Aristotelian philosophy with its concern 
with essences, had led philosophers to look again at what is life and what are humans, inspiring the 
development of philosophical biology and philosophical anthropology in terms free from and challenging 
the prevailing Newtonian framework of concepts (Gare, 2008, 55ff.).  
These divisions among phenomenologists revealed the tension in Husserl’s work between his concern 
to describe conscious experience, which is essentially temporal, and Frege’s ahistorical objectivism. 
Throughout his career, Husserl was centrally concerned with time and temporality, a theme that had been 
placed at the centre of psychology by James and even more emphatically by Henri Bergson. Bergson had 
argued against the spatialized, geometrized conception of time assumed by mainstream science on the 
grounds that it is inconsistent with the immediately given experience of temporality as durational 
becoming (Capek, 1971). Clearly influenced by James and Bergson, Husserl from his early work had 
grappled with the experience of temporality (specifically, inner-time consciousness) in his study of 
experience and his characterization of consciousness (Husserl, 1991). Experience was characterized as 
integrated at a ‘pre-predicative’ (i.e. unreflective) level by a hierarchy of ‘protentions’ and ‘retentions’ 
whereby a partially open future is seen to be largely anticipated before it becomes present, carrying with it 
a pre-predicative awareness of what had been present. Space was then reconceived accordingly as lived 
space. This theme was taken up by Heidegger who edited Husserl’s work on time and focused on 
temporality in his early lectures (Heidegger, 2009). Time was central to his first major work, Being and 
Time, and to his characterization of human existence as ‘being-in-the-world (Heidegger, 1985). Almost all 
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later phenomenologists, and all those who rejected Husserl’s Idealist turn, were pre-occupied with lived 
temporality and spatiality. Such work on time, space and embodiment greatly influenced the development 
of philosophical biology along with philosophical anthropology where it was used to develop Jacob von 
Uexküll’s argument that to understand living organisms, including humans, it is necessary to understand 
their worlds and how these are constituted (Buchanan, 2008, Gare, 2009, 269). A number of 
phenomenologists have continued this project (Tymieniecka, 2007). 
This appreciation of temporality did not sit easily with Husserl’s early characterization of the 
constitution of objects. However, as he developed his philosophy, Husserl moved from an essentially 
static to a genetic conception of constitution in which he examined the origins of intentionalities, thereby 
opening up phenomenology to investigate how consciousness develops from more basic experiences of 
objects of the life-world to synthesise and constitute more abstract and more complex objects and 
relations (Bruzina, 116-138). After making this transition to genetic phenomenology, Husserl consistently 
referred to consciousness as a life (Bruzina, 129). He emphasized that the transcendental ego was the 
formal ego postulated by Kant, but only existed as ‘lived’; involving a living body (Husserl, 1970b, 
104ff.). This not only allowed for the development of a phenomenological psychology, but also for the 
study of the development of such concepts and the corresponding development of consciousness through 
history. It justified treating the life-world and its relation to mathematics and science themselves as 
historical, leading him to examine how idealities emerge and are sedimented into historical traditions and 
instituted as traditions. Geometry, and the tradition of research on it, exemplified this (Husserl, 1970b, 
354). 
Merleau-Ponty’s Naturalized Phenomenology    
The philosopher who took up and developed phenomenology in this direction most fully was Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty. Merleau-Ponty’s first major work, The Structure of Behaviour (1967) was heavily 
influenced by the philosophical biologists and philosophical anthropologists inspired by phenomenology, 
and offered a severe critique from a phenomenological perspective of objectifying approaches to 
psychology that excluded any place for experience and consciousness. Subsequently, he gained access to 
Husserl’s unpublished work, most importantly, Husserl’s later works on the life-world and perceptual 
consciousness, and all his work on temporality (Bruzina, 86). His next major work, The Primacy of 
Perception, in which he conceived being human as being-to-the-world and consistently deployed a 
genetic approach to constitution, was the product of his engagement with this later work. The theme most 
fully developed in this work was that of embodiment. Totally rejecting Cartesian dualism and all 
philosophies influenced by it, including both empiricism and neo-Kantian intellectualism, Merleau-Ponty 
argued that the body is neither an objective function nor a pure intellect but is first and foremost a lived 
body. Expression similarly cannot be grasped as an object nor as an intellectual thought, but is a 
structuring of experience and modulation of existence whereby the senses of the lived body come to be 
known, made explicit and decided. The focus on the lived body was not seen to imply an acceptance of 
Husserl’s effort to establish philosophy as a foundational discipline through a rigorous science of the 
experience of the individual. Merleau-Ponty, like Strasser and Schutz, argued that we are essentially 
social, and developed this view by embracing and further developing Husserl’s notion of the life-world. 
In doing so, he rejected not only the approach of Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations in which he had 
embraced and attempted to radicalize Descartes’ focus on the thinking subject, but also the claim that 
phenomenology could serve as a foundational discipline providing certain knowledge superior to that of 
the natural sciences. Having been acquainted with the very last works of Husserl where, reflecting on the 
importance of history, he had acknowledged the failure of the quest for an apodictically rigorous scientific 
philosophy, and living in an intellectual environment saturated with Hegelian scholarship, Merleau-Ponty 
argued that human existence is not only social but essentially historical. Interpreting the life-world on this 
basis precluded the current life-world being taken as an absolute reference point.  
Merleau-Ponty, instead, redefined the goal of phenomenology and its relation to the sciences. While he 
was equally critical of claims made within the sciences that their objective knowledge of humans grasped 
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the true nature of humanity, and its tendency to dismiss conscious experience in all its complexity as 
illusory, he did not regard such claims to objective knowledge as completely wrong or argue that 
scientific knowledge has to be totally subordinated to phenomenology. He argued that such knowledge 
has to be made sense of, incorporated into the life-world and into our experience of the world through 
phenomenology. As he put it in a study of sociology and its relation to philosophy: 
Philosophy is indeed, and always, a break with objectivism and return from constructa to lived experience, 
from the world to ourselves. It is just that this indispensible and characteristic step no longer transports it into 
the rarified atmosphere of introspection or into a realm numerically distinct from that of science. It no longer 
makes philosophy the rival of scientific knowledge, now that we have recognized the “interior” it brings us 
back to is not a “private life” but an intersubjectivity that gradually connects us ever closer to the whole of 
history (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, 112).  
What this involved is illustrated by Merleau-Ponty’s engagement with the findings of the 
neuroscientist, Kurt Goldstein. This engagement initially was mediated by Ernst Cassirer’s study of this 
work, and in the process, Merleau-Ponty incorporated insights from Kant on the productive imagination 
(Matherne 2014). Goldstein was looking at what was then called aphasia, the loss of the ability to use 
words. An example is a person who could not name a knife as such, but could call it an ‘apple-parer’. 
This could be regarded as nothing but bad memory, but looked at closely as Merleau-Ponty did, it 
suggests the loss of an abstract attitude to the world, or the ability to constitute more abstract objects of 
perception, to use Husserl’s terminology. Merleau-Ponty did not leave it there but showed the correlation 
between a whole range of deficiencies, thereby revealing global features of our normal perception that we 
are so used to that it is difficult to be aware of, and would not have been revealed by the mechanical 
exercise of a phenomenological method. For instance, this same person could not knock on an imaginary 
door, revealing how bound he was to his immediate practical context. Looking at the implications of this, 
Merleau-Ponty pointed out that the normal capacity to identify something such as a knife is to see it not 
just as something there but as having a huge range of potential functions independent of the particular 
context in which it is perceived and identified as such. As he put it, ‘The normal person reckons with the 
possible, which thus, without shifting from its position as a possibility, acquires a sort of actuality. In the 
patient’s case, however, the field of actuality is limited to what is met with in the shape of a real contact 
or is related to these data by some explicit process of deduction’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 109). Not even 
chimpanzees abstract themselves from their particular context. Other living beings are bound to their 
contexts in a way that normal humans are not, and this is the basis of their freedom and their capacity for 
creativity. 
No phenomenological study is final and complete, Merleau-Ponty argued. It can and should be 
challenged by historical developments, including advances in science. This was Merleau-Ponty’s own 
approach, which while being phenomenological, made extensive use of scientific research. This makes all 
knowledge historically relative to some extent and brings into question the old idea and ideals of truth. 
This does not mean abandoning the quest for truth, but recognizing that these old ideas and ideals were 
always problematic. As Merleau-Ponty noted, ‘As long as I cling to the ideal of an absolute spectator, of 
knowledge with no point of view, I can see my situation as nothing but a source of error’ (1964, 109). 
Opposing this, and celebrating the embodied situatedness of individuals as the condition of there being 
any truth, Merleau-Ponty argued that phenomenology founds a new idea of truth in which historical 
developments and advances in science have to be made sense of by individuals in contact with their social 
milieu and in the finitude of their situations. These are revealed as ‘the point of origin of all truth, 
including scientific truth’ (1964, 109).  
Merleau-Ponty was pre-occupied with the lived body and its ambiguous nature until the end of his life. 
He was writing a book, The Visible and the Invisible, which was unfinished at the time of his death, on 
this topic. Here he attempted to redefine and provide an ontology in terms of ‘flesh’, observing its 
peculiar reversibility as neither mere object of experience nor mere subject, and treating it as ‘the concrete 
emblem of a general manner of being’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1969, 147). ‘Flesh’ is exemplified by hands 
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touching each other, simultaneously being touched and touching. Effectively, this ontology was Merleau-
Ponty’s alternative to Husserl’s transcendental ego as the ‘foundation’ for philosophy. The role played by 
this ‘foundation’ in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy was very different, however. The ontology of the flesh 
resolved the subject-object question by pointing to a primordial realm that was more fundamental than, 
and the condition for, the subject-object opposition, containing this opposition within it. Flesh for 
Merleau-Ponty is not merely that of individuals, although it is this, but is also the matrix that underlies 
and gives rise to the perceiver and the perceived. As a landscape opens out from the flesh of each hand 
enveloping each other and interwoven with the landscapes opening from other flesh, and this is 
immediately understood from the particular flesh of the individual. As Merleau-Ponty put it: 
My body is made of the same flesh as the world (it is perceived), and moreover that this flesh of my body is 
shared by the world (the felt [scenti] at the same time the culminating of subjectivity and the culmination of 
materiality), they are in a relation of transgression or of overlapping --- This also means: my body is not only 
one perceived among others, it is the measurant (mesrant) of all, Nullpunkt of all the dimensions of the world 
(1969,  222). 
Flesh is the world of life lived from within by the intelligent body which (or who) is part of the world he 
or she experiences.  
The quest to naturalize phenomenology, explicitly conceived as such, emerged as part of the reaction 
to various reductionist forms of cognitive science. This reaction was provoked by efforts to extend 
reductionist science to the brain to eliminate the last vestiges of respect for the reality of life, mind and 
humanity. To begin with, opponents of such reductionism turned to Merleau-Ponty’s work. Hubert 
Dreyfus had utilized Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological studies to expose the limitations of 
representational models of the mind and computational models of cognition (Dreyfus, 1992). Franscisco 
Varela turned to Merleau-Ponty in his efforts to overcome the deeply entrenched assumptions of 
mainstream science, influencing even those (including Varela himself) who were striving to overcome 
these assumptions. Having been involved with Maturana in developing the concept of autopoiesis, he 
came to see that even this concept, allowing that organisms are self-making, was still too mechanistic. 
Teaming up with Evan Thompson and Eleanor Tosch, Varela charted the path for an alliance between 
post-reductionist cognitive science and phenomenology through a naturalized phenomenology, a 
development that has not only advanced cognitive science, but psychology generally, including social 
psychology, psycholinguistics and psychopathology, and has given birth to the new discipline of 
neurophenomenology (Varela et. al. 1993; Petitot et.al. 1999; Gallagher and Schmicking, 2010). These 
phenomenologists have re-examined Husserl’s work and defended Merleau-Ponty’s claim to be 
developing Husserl’s philosophy against conventional interpretations of his work. Dan Zahavi even 
questioned whether Husserl was ever an Idealist, claiming that his ‘transcendental Idealism’ was really a 
form of internal realism, as this had been defended by Hilary Putnam (Zahavi, 2003, 68ff.). What this 
evolution of ideas has revealed has not only been that the claims of phenomenology to be elucidating the 
primordial conditions for truth, including scientific truth, to emerge have to be respected by scientists as a 
form of truth, but that any claim to scientific knowledge inconsistent with these claims must be rejected as 
invalid, or at least defective beyond a limited domain of validity. This has engendered a growing body of 
research in which scientific research is guided by phenomenological studies of experience, while 
phenomenological research has attempted to take into account and learn from such scientific research. 
Naturalized Phenomenology and the Philosophy of Nature 
While working on The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty was also giving a course of lectures on 
the philosophy of nature and tracing the history of the concept of nature. This should be seen in 
conjunction with and as complementary to his work on flesh. Echoing Schelling’s claim that there is an 
unprethinkable being preceding all thought, Merleau-Ponty argued in this work that ‘Nature is … an all-
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encompassing something, as a type of englobing being in which we discover ourselves already invested 
prior to all reflection’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2003, 84). To develop this conception of nature he examined and 
engaged with the philosophies of Descartes, Kant, Schelling, Bergson, Husserl and Whitehead, and also 
examined developments in modern physics and revisited and further developed his earlier research on 
philosophical and theoretical biology. In this he focused in particular on Jacob von Üexkull and the 
concept of the Umwelt (surrounding world) of organisms. Essentially, Merleau-Ponty was extending his 
argument about the relation of the human sciences to phenomenology to the natural sciences generally. 
Far from supporting Idealism, phenomenology reveals to us that we as flesh are part not only of an 
intersubjective world but also part of nature in which there are diverse organisms with their surrounding 
worlds that intersect with our own. We are situated not only in human history but within the englobing 
being of nature in which other organisms are also situated. We know and can only know this history and 
develop our knowledge of nature through our bodily engagement in history and nature. Ultimately, we 
have to recognize that we are part of the world that we are striving to know, a world that is always open 
and unfinished, both for us and for other organisms. We are products/producers of history and 
products/producers of nature, and the goal of the natural sciences should be to situate us in and help 
connect us to the whole of nature and its history, not explain away our existence.  
If Merleau-Ponty is right in his characterization of nature, all science, including mathematics, physics, 
chemistry and biology, must be judged according to whether it is consistent with the reality of humans as 
flesh, historically situated beings-to-the-world participating in an englobing nature. It was for this reason 
that Merleau-Ponty included work on recent physics in his lectures on nature. Obviously, Merleau-
Ponty’s naturalist phenomenology requires the rejection of traditional reductionism according to which 
consciousness and life are at best epiphenomena of chemical processes explicable through physics. 
However, proclaiming this does not provide answers to the most important problems that have to be 
addressed in the quest to naturalize phenomenology, the place accorded mathematics while accounting for 
the emergence of consciousness. Husserl has been opposed to the naturalistic attitude for a number of 
reasons. Naturalism appeared to provide no grounds for upholding ideals, it could not account for the 
objective necessity characteristic of mathematics, and it seemed incapable of accounting for 
consciousness. In order to defend Merleau-Ponty’s naturalization of phenomenology, it is necessary to 
answer questions about the ontological status of mathematical objects that the proponents of this 
movement have not begun to address, and consider how living forms that can be studied objectively can 
at the same time be aware and conscious. While Merleau-Ponty pointed to work in physics and 
mathematics supporting his claims that this conception of the physical world has been overcome, with the 
exception of Steven Rosen and Fernando Zalemea, those inspired by Merleau-Ponty have not attempted 
to deal with these issues (S. Rosen, 2008; Zalemea, 2012). This has left major lacunae in their work. 
While it might not be regarded as equally important, it is also necessary to give a place to ideals, 
including the ideals that define science, the breakdown of which it could be argued are now threatening 
science, reducing it to nothing but an instrument for advancing profitable or militarily useful technology.  
Since concern with mathematics was central to Husserl’s thinking and central to his transcendental 
Idealism, the first issue that must be confronted by phenomenological naturalists is whether Husserl’s 
view of mathematics does rule out naturalism, and if it does, can it be modified to fit a naturalized 
phenomenology. Husserl himself at the end of his career summed his views very briefly when he wrote 
that ‘Mathematical method “constructs,” out of intuitive representation, ideal objects and teaches how to 
deal with them operatively and systematically’ (Husserl, 1970b, 348). The difficulty here is interpreting 
what he meant by intuitive representation and ideal objects. While Husserl was strongly influenced by 
Frege and corresponded with Hilbert and other leading mathematicians, both Gödel, a Platonist, and 
Hermann Weyl, an intuitionist, aligned themselves with Husserl’s phenomenology, leaving interpreters 
struggling to understand how this was possible (Feist, 2003). Fortunately, Richard Tieszen has offered a 
coherent account of Husserl’s views on mathematics and how these evolved, including his later genetic 
approach to the development of mathematical concepts (Tieszen, 2005). This does seem to be compatible 
with a form of naturalism if it can be formulated to make intelligible the practices described by Husserl, 
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but to reconcile these it will be necessary to clarify and rethink both Husserl’s characterizations of 
mathematics and naturalism.  
The advantage of Husserl’s philosophy of mathematics is that it acknowledges the objective status of 
mathematical knowledge central to the thinking of the Platonists, while avoiding elevating its 
metaphysical status so that knowledge of it becomes unintelligible. Husserl emphasized the role of 
imagination in exploring possibilities, and argues that it was only through such exploration that science 
became possible. As he put it, ‘The science of pure possibilities must everywhere precede the science of 
real facts, and give it the guidance of its concrete logic’ (Husserl, 1931, 7). When explained genetically, 
the development of consciousness and the development of the capacity to comprehend increasingly 
complex and abstract objects could be seen as correlative while still grounded in the embodied 
engagement by individuals in society and nature. However, there is still the problem of characterizing the 
ontological status of mathematical entities and relations (or ‘idealizations’) and how they can be 
conceived to be part of nature. Schelling, Bergson and Whitehead, the philosophers of nature turned to by 
Merleau-Ponty, do offer some guidance in answering this question. So also does C.S. Peirce, who 
characterized himself as a Schellingian of some stripe, transformed in the light of modern physics. It 
appears that Husserl’s understanding of mathematics has much in common with the later philosophy of 
mathematics of Whitehead and both can usefully be interpreted through the work of Peirce. This could 
provide the conception of mathematics required to uphold Merleau-Ponty’s conception of nature. What 
these philosophers defended in their later work could not be characterized as Platonism, formalism, 
logicism, intuititionism or quasi-empiricism, but a form of structuralism grounded in experience, avoiding 
the extreme formalism on which later structuralism foundered (Corry, 2004). In each case, what is 
acknowledged by these philosophers is the place of possibilities in nature that has little or no place in the 
reductionist forms of naturalism that have dominated since the overthrow of Aristotelian metaphysics. 
This is the naturalism that Husserl was so hostile to. By virtue of giving a place to possibilities, without 
treating these as Platonic forms, they validate Husserl’s concern to recognize the role of ideation in 
experience, as appreciation of possibilities. This acknowledgement of possibilities in turn is based on 
conceiving nature as a creative process of becoming, rather than as a completely determined ‘block’ 
universe. 
Husserl, Whitehead and Peirce on Mathematics 
Whitehead’s later philosophy was based on a careful study of experience, and for this reason alone it 
bears similar features to phenomenology. His overall philosophy is best understood as a naturalized form 
of Platonism, and for this reason also his understanding of mathematics has much in common with 
Husserl’s mature philosophy of mathematics as characterized by Tieszen. In his speculative cosmology 
Whitehead characterized a realm of pure possibilities as ‘eternal objects’, or as he later referred to these, 
as ‘potentialities for definiteness’, inter-related in definite ways to every other potentiality for 
definiteness, and mathematics was characterized by him as the study of some aspects of this realm. Every 
potentiality for definiteness is also related to every ‘actual occasion’, the primary existents in Whitehead’s 
ontology, and it is through the ‘concrescence’ (the process of self-formation) of actual occasions that 
these possibilities are realized as actual forms of definiteness in what exists (Code, 1985, 163ff.). 
Whitehead characterized mathematics as the study of objective forms of definiteness: forms, relations and 
most importantly, patterns and their transformations. He was highly critical of the excessive role accorded 
to number in mathematics. It is only in special branches of mathematics that quantity and number are the 
dominant themes, Whitehead argued, and quantity by itself only provides a very crude understanding of 
nature. ‘[B]eyond all questions of quantity there lie questions of pattern, which are essential for the 
understanding of nature’ Whitehead wrote (Whitehead, 1968, 143). Elsewhere he proclaimed that 
mathematics is a ‘general science’ for the investigation of ‘patterns of connectedness, in abstraction from 
the particular relata and the particular modes of connection’ (Whitehead, 1933, 197), and that it is ‘the 
most powerful technique for the understanding of pattern, and for the relationships between patterns’ 
(Whitehead, 1951, 678). This should be seen to include the transformation of patterns to realize new 
11 
 
patterns. When we say ‘twice three is six’, Whitehead proclaimed, ‘we are not saying that these two sides 
of the equation mean the same thing, but that two threes is a fluent process which become six as a 
completed pattern.’ So, for Whitehead, ‘mathematics is concerned with certain forms of process issuing 
into forms which are components of further process’ (Whitehead, 1968, 92). 
While Whitehead lauded the achievements of mathematics, at the same time he argued that it could 
only deal with some aspects of reality. Mathematics involves abstraction. Abstraction as such is essential 
to life. According to Whitehead, ‘The growth of consciousness is the uprise of abstractions. It is the 
growth of emphasis. The totality is characterised by a selection from its details. … Thus a fortunate use of 
abstractions is of the essence of upward evolution’ (Whitehead, 1968, 123). When we abstract, ‘we 
necessarily introduce the notion of potentiality’ which ‘is fundamental for the understanding of existence, 
as soon as the notion of process is admitted. ... Hope and fear, joy and disillusion, obtain their meaning 
from the potentialities essential to the nature of things’ (Whitehead, 1968, 99f.). The highest form of 
abstraction grasps the ‘eternal objects’ such as colours, numbers, relations and patterns. However, 
grasping these in isolation from each other and then in their particular relations should always be 
understood as abstractions, and to fail to do this, to treat abstractions without acknowledging that they are 
abstractions, is to commit the ‘fallacy of misplaced concreteness’.  
Peirce’s philosophy, which he characterized as ‘pragmaticism’, differs from Whitehead’s in crucial 
respects, but is not entirely incommensurable with it and deals with aspects of mathematics where 
Whitehead’s philosophy is silent, while Whitehead’s philosophy provides the ‘objects’ (possible patterns 
as forms of definiteness and their transformations) required by Peirce’s philosophy. Like Whitehead and 
Husserl, Peirce was concerned to do justice to all experience, and argued that philosophy must begin with 
phenomenology, the study of appearances at their face value, describing and classifying whatever appears 
before consciousness. This involved recognizing potentialities, existents, and lawfulness. As he put it: 
‘My view is that there are three modes of being. I hold that we can directly observe them in elements of 
whatever is at any time before the mind in any way. They are the being of positive qualitative possibility, 
the being of actual fact, and the being of law that will govern facts in the future’ (CP 1.23). Through 
Peirce’s influence on William James, this commitment to the careful study of appearances also influenced 
Husserl.  
However, like Whitehead, Peirce gave a major place in philosophy to speculation. Speculating, he 
suggested that the universe began as pure potentiality. or as he put it, in ‘the process of derivation, a 
process which extends from before time and from before logic, we cannot suppose that it began elsewhere 
than in the utter vagueness of completely undetermined and dimensionless potentiality’ (CP 6.193). This 
chaos eventually gave rise to self-reinforcing habits. With habits, nature was differentiated, leading to 
reactions. With dyadic relations, it became possible to interpret habits as signs, and on this basis, make 
predictions. Peirce characterized the sign most generally as that which ‘mediates between an object and 
an interpretant; since it is both determined by the object relatively to the interpretant, and determines the 
interpretant in reference to the object, in such wise as to cause the interpretant to be determined by the 
object through the mediation of the “sign”’ (EP II: 410). Sign activity is triadic, and thus lends itself to 
forming sequences and networks of semiosis, with interpretants, which can be original creations, 
becoming increasingly complex. This makes possible the development of ever more complex and creative 
forms of semiosis. Life is based on semiosis, and with humans, semiosis becomes more complex again. 
Mathematics is a form of semiosis. As one interpreter of Peirce, Susanna Marietti put it: 
Mathematics is, in Peirce’s, view, a semiotic activity. It is semiotic because it deals with signs, and it is an 
activity because ... it actively operates on them. Such a semiotic view of mathematics must be able to account, 
among other things, for three properties of mathematical knowledge, two of which are acknowledged by 
everybody and the third of which is in any case maintained by Peirce. Namely, such a view must account, first 
of all, for the universality of mathematical knowledge; secondly, for certainty of it; and thirdly, for its fertility, 
that is to say its ability to get – while applying its peculiar instruments of reasoning – knowledge which turns 
out to be authentically new (Marietti, 2010, 148). 
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It is this capacity to generate new knowledge that interpreters of Peirce have had difficulty accounting 
for since there appears to be no object or ‘Secondness’, the subject matter in the semiotic process resisting 
false beliefs (Cooke, 2010, 169). This is where Whitehead’s notion of possible patterns as forms of 
definiteness and their transformations complements Peirce’s semiotic interpretation of mathematics. 
Mathematics, Peirce argued, is the science which draws necessary conclusions from exclusively 
hypothetical states of things (Peirce, 1955, 140), where an hypothesis is ‘a proposition imagined to be 
strictly true of an ideal state of things’ (Peirce, 1955, 137). Necessary conclusions are drawn by 
mathematicians through the use of diagrams which function as analogies to such hypotheses. As Peirce 
put it: 
 [Mathematical deduction consists in constructing an icon or diagram the relations of whose parts shall present a 
complete analogy with those of the parts of the object of reasoning, or experimenting upon this image in the 
imagination, and of observing the result so as to discover unnoticed and hidden relations among the parts. 
(Peirce, 1992, 227) 
This includes algebra.  
Peirce argued that with the development of mathematics as a system of iconic signs, nature can now be 
interpreted through mathematically expressible law (although even here actuality will involve an element 
of chance and so will not entirely conform to the necessity of mathematical deductions). However, again 
like Husserl and Whitehead, Peirce argued that it is impossible to grasp the whole of existence through 
mathematics because it is impossible through mathematics to account for the emergence of variety. The 
evolution of laws of nature that can be represented mathematically cannot be modelled mathematically. 
Like Whitehead, Peirce argued that potentialities and possibilities are a real part of what there is. He did 
not accept the view that an objective understanding of nature must be free of the constructive mind and 
any anthropomorphic elements. For Peirce, nature is more akin to mind than brute matter, and matter is 
effete mind hidebound by habits. The centrality of semiosis in nature is based on and is an extension of 
his understanding of human cognition, and as nature is perfused with signs, it is perfused with 
‘interpretants’. Peirce understood that experimental science involves active intervention in nature to 
enable it to respond to questions put to it, and that where-ever predictive laws could be found, these 
would be operative in particular conditions and would need to be explained. The place and importance of 
ideality and idealizations in nature were also recognized by Peirce. 
While Peirce’s philosophy is incomplete and not beyond criticism, through it, it is possible to more 
fully appreciate the convergence of naturalized phenomenology with post-mechanistic philosophies of 
nature exemplified by Schelling and Whitehead. Peirce situated mathematics and the efforts to understand 
nature through mathematics within nature and as a further development of nature’s semiosis. He was 
implicitly opposed to the whole idea of abstract mathematical concepts as a universal language, arguing 
that mathematics can only complement other forms of semiosis that often utilize, and have to utilize, 
vague terms. It is only in specific contexts that mathematics can be applied, and then since there is always 
some element of chance in nature, its application will always involve some degree of idealization, as Ilya 
Prigogine (1997) has argued. It is not difficult to interpret Peirce’s understanding of mathematics and the 
role of diagrams as the study of what Whitehead referred to as patterns or modes of togetherness, with 
necessary conclusions being the relations revealed through the study of these patterns. This is consistent 
with Husserl’s later philosophy of mathematics, and illuminates it. All this is not only consistent with 
naturalized phenomenology. It has the added advantage that, through the place accorded to semiosis and 
its characterization, a means is provided for understanding the relationship between objectifying ways of 
grasping reality and non-objectifying appreciation of temporal becoming; for instance, through telling 
stories. This is consistent with Merleau-Ponty’s view of flesh experiencing itself within the englobing 
being of nature. 
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Michael Polanyi and Hierarchy Theory 
There have been advances in more recent work on the philosophy of nature, some of it directly or 
indirectly influenced by Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. Michael Polanyi’s work, Personal 
Knowledge (1958) was probably influenced by Heidegger, while Polanyi acknowledged that Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology foreshadowed his own work (Polanyi, 1969, 222). Heidegger argued in ‘The 
Question Concerning Technology’ that experimental science is based on enframing nature, setting upon it 
to reveal itself as a coherence of forces calculable in advance and reducing reasoning to calculation 
(Heidegger, 1977, 21). Polanyi pointed out that scientific work generally involves setting up boundary 
conditions that allow particular processes to be studied by altering initial conditions and measuring 
outcomes at a later time, while ignoring the fact that such processes only occur as scientists portray them 
within the boundary conditions they have set in place, and measurements being made when the scientists 
choose to do so. No boundary conditions are set in place for the study of the solar system, but this is a 
highly unusual system with boundary conditions already in place. It is possible to set up boundary 
conditions because boundary conditions exist in nature, and it is these that provide the conditions for new 
levels of organization to develop. The properties and laws of structures produced by chemicals, for 
instance, are the boundary conditions for and are harnessed by higher level organization as living 
organisms constrained by semiotic processes. On this basis Polanyi defended what he called ‘hierarchical 
ontology.’ Polanyi’s work in turn influenced Howard Pattee’s hierarchy theory based on the notion of 
facilitative constraints, treating mathematically and generalizing the notion of boundary conditions as 
non-holonomic constraints to account for emergence of levels of control and the symbols required for 
these. Pattee’s work was further developed by Timothy Allen and Thomas Starr, Robert Rosen, Stan 
Salthe and Alicia Juarrero,  among others (Pattee, 2012, 91ff.; Umerez, 2001, 162f.; Allen & Starr, 1982; 
Rosen, 1988; Salthe, 1993; Juarrero 1998 & 2002). 
Polanyi also pointed out the personal element in all knowledge, and in this he was influenced by, or at 
least aligned with Merleau-Ponty’s argument, that scientific knowledge can only be made sense of by 
embodied, situated individuals. Polanyi pointed out that all knowledge involves ‘indwelling’ in the 
instruments and theories deployed in such investigation and in that which is being investigated, and it is 
only with the tacit knowledge of this background that is ‘dwelt within’ that what is focused on makes 
sense. This is the personal element in science. The ‘from-to’ structure of this indwelling is prone to blind 
reductionists, claiming totally objective knowledge, from acknowledging the boundary conditions that 
have been set up in experimental science, and the reality of higher levels of order they are investigating 
when they purport to explain these through their constituents. For instance, when examining life, they fail 
to notice that the chemical processes they investigate could not survive except in the environment created 
by the functioning organism and are being constrained to serve this functioning. They fail to appreciate 
this background tacit dimension of their own knowledge. This argument in turn influenced Thomas Kuhn 
in his characterization of science as socialization into disciplinary matrixes through the use of 
‘exemplars’, the problem-solutions that have defined the success of past science, the mastery of which 
(along with the tacit knowledge gained through this mastery) is required for them to participate in the 
advance of science. 
From Anti-Humanist Objectivism to Endophysics 
The development of naturalized phenomenology and the philosophy of nature have exposed and 
brought into question deeply held assumptions that have defined science since the seventeenth century. 
The progress of these phenomenologists has been impressive. However, while phenomenological 
cognitive science and neurophenomenology are now major fields of research, they have only grappled 
with a small part of biology, let alone science generally. And it is still widely believed that the quest for 
objective knowledge has been most fully realized in physics, and that all scientific explanations must 
ultimately be reducible to chemistry, then physics. Briefly, we remain children of Newton, despite the 
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vast transformation Darwin wrought. Newton, then more rigorously (and incoherently) Laplace, laid the 
foundations of modern “Reductive Materialism”, which remains our model of science itself, including 
“Dreams of a Final Theory” (Weinberg, 1992).  Defending naturalized phenomenology, an even more 
fundamental assumption (formulated explicitly by Max Planck), that objective scientific knowledge has to 
be totally independent of the structuring individual mind and emancipated from all anthropomorphic 
elements, has to be challenged. The first requirement of understanding the logic of this development is to 
work out what objectivism as characterized by Planck meant, and how it came to be embraced as an ideal 
by scientists in the first place. This involves understanding the ideal of science set up by Newton, but 
even more fundamentally, the ideal of scientific explanation privileging logic and mathematics that has 
led to the commitment to account for the whole universe through a set of mathematical equations. Why 
should objectivism be taken as excluding any role to the structuring mind or anthropomorphic elements?  
The obvious answer to this question is that objectivism so conceived is the extension of a trajectory 
concerned to eliminate any subjective bias and to overcome the limitations of particular perspectives. This 
serves as a partial explanation. However, objectivism can be conceived as that which is intersubjectively 
valid without excluding the mind or anthropomorphic elements from knowing, and in fact it is impossible 
to exclude subjects from the objects that are known; as Brentano and Husserl pointed out. Furthermore, to 
claim to have knowledge that life and mind are mere appearances that can be fully explained through 
chemistry and physics is not an objective judgment. Since it involves scientists viewing their scientific 
judgments as merely the epiphenomena of deterministic chemical and physical processes, it is self-
contradictory. Clearly, something more is involved.  
Part of reason for such beliefs is, paradoxically, subjective. The flight to so-called objectivity continues 
a long tradition of flight from acknowledging the reality of temporal becoming characteristic of life and 
consciousness. As Lee Smolin wrote in his recent book Time Reborn, ‘I used to believe in the essential 
unreality of time. Indeed, I went into physics because as an adolescent I yearned to exchange the time 
bound, human world, which I saw as ugly and inhospitable, for a world of pure, timeless truth’ (Smolin, 
2013, xii). There are deeper assumptions leading to these claims, however. One of these is that objective 
knowledge must be timelessly true, and along with this, that timeless truths are only possible in a world 
that in some fundamental sense is timeless. If nature can be represented through mathematical models, 
these provide the timeless objects of knowledge. As Smolin noted, physicists believe ‘that the task of 
physics is the discovery of a timeless mathematical equation that captures every aspect of the universe.’ 
(Smolin, 2013 xvi). This belief is rooted in the whole history of Western thought, beginning with 
Pythagoras’ claim that all is number, the implications of which were spelt out dramatically in Parmenides 
claim, defended by Zeno, that the way of truth leads to the view that the universe is an undifferentiated, 
unchanging plenum, and that the appearances of diversity and change are illusions (Hintikka, 1974, 58ff.). 
Atomists accounted for the appearance of change by allowing that a large number of plenums or atoms 
could move in the void. The obvious implausibility of these views was overcome with the rise of modern 
science deploying new forms of mathematics. With developments in mathematics allowing for more 
complex spatial order, the apparent absurdity of Parmenides philosophy has been gradually diminished, 
allowing more recent scientists to claim that they are arriving at the kind of timeless knowledge of a 
timeless reality that was implicitly the ideal of knowledge from the Ancient Greeks onwards (Gare, 
2005). Galileo had represented motion mathematically. Descartes’ analytic geometry provided a means of 
representing all physical existence algebraically, and with Newton’s and Leibniz’s development of 
calculus, time was able to be represented by Lagrange as the fourth dimension of space.  
We all know Newton’s triumph, following Descartes and the failure of his res cogitans, Galileo, 
Copernicus, and Kepler. One mind invented the differential and integral calculus, three laws of motion, 
the law of universal gravitation and created the framework of “objective” classical physics.   
Newton mathematized Aristotle’s efficient cause. His laws of motion in differential equation form give 
the “forces” between the moving particles, say balls rolling on a billiard table. The balls have mass and 
energy due their motion or gravitational potential energy, so the laws of motion are efficient cause.  
Given seven balls rolling on a billiard table, Newton tells us what to do: Write down the positions and 
momenta of all the balls. Write down the boundary conditions of the edge of the table. Write down the 
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differential equations giving the forces among the colliding balls and balls and wall (via the third law). 
Then, to find out what will happen to the balls over time, integrate the differential equations to obtain the 
future trajectories of the balls (forever if we ignore friction). But to integrate the differential equations is 
to deduce the consequences of the differential equations for the trajectories of the balls. But deduction is 
“entailment”. “All men are mortal, Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal”. In this Greek 
syllogism, the truth of the conclusion is entailed by the truth of the two premises. Newton gave us a view 
of the world’s becoming as entirely entailed. Nothing not entailed could arise.  
Laplace, somewhat over a century later, noted that were we to know the positions and momenta of all 
the particles in the universe, a vast calculating engine, Laplace’s demon, could use Newton’s laws to 
calculate the entire entailed, hence determined, becoming of the universe forward and backward in time - 
because Newton’s laws are time reversible.  
Laplace gave us the birth of modern objective science Reductive Materialism, the belief that “down 
there” are laws which will entail the entire becoming of the universe, given initial and perhaps boundary 
conditions. This reductionism to laws “down there” is material because the laws are efficient cause laws 
with forces and matter and energy. This is the Pythagoran Dream of a set of laws outside the universe, 
fixed, immutable, that governs all.  All questions stop at the foundational laws. More, in this view, 
nothing new and radically emergent can come into being. And perhaps most important, with the triumph 
of Classical Physics, objective science, we literally lost our minds, our subjective pole, our humanity and 
any legitimacy of phenomenology. 
It is this that justifies the view that time as becoming is an illusion, a view that has continued to 
dominate science. As Einstein concluded, it is natural ‘to think of physical reality as a four-dimensional 
existence, instead of, as hitherto, the evolution of a three-dimensional existence’ (1961, 141).’ Hermann 
Weyl followed Einstein and simply asserted as fact that ‘The objective world simply is, it does not 
happen’ (1949, 116).’ This view has been supported more recently by quantum cosmology uniting 
quantum theory with general relativity, where as Lee Smolin put it, ‘time is not just redundant, it 
disappears completely. The quantum cosmos doesn’t evolve or change, it doesn’t expand or contract, it 
simply is’ (Smolin, 2013, 77). The structuring mind and anthropic elements, which can only be 
comprehended as temporal becoming, therefore must be illusions explicable entirely through chemistry 
and physics.  
From Exophysics to Endophysics 
It is here that the ideas of the endophysicists bring into question the assumptions underlying this 
objectivism, and in doing so, converge with the work of the naturalist phenomenologists. Just as the 
rigorous formulation of Idealism by Husserl revealed most clearly the weakness of this philosophy and 
paved the way for his successors to develop a radically post-Cartesian understanding of humans as part of 
nature, so the very quest for a thoroughly objective knowledge of nature, understood as giving no place to 
the structuring mind or anthropomorphic elements, has forced scientists to acknowledge that while such 
an approach can be useful, ultimately it is necessary to acknowledge that we as conscious, active beings 
are part of what we are striving to understand, and this has to be incorporated into science.  
To begin with, it should be noted that not all proponents of mathematical physics have been committed 
to this Pythagorean/Parmenidean objectivism. Descartes, appreciating that the mind could not be 
comprehended in terms of the conception of physical existence he was defending in his philosophy of 
nature and believing that minds do exist, famously defended dualism.  He allowed that two totally 
different kinds of being could interact with each other, an incoherent position, as Spinoza pointed out. 
Even Einstein in his mature years, after having developed his general theory of relativity and interpreted it 
in accordance with a Pythagorean/Parmenidean view of the universe, was not satisfied that science could 
explain away the privileged place accorded to the experience of ‘Now’, clearly fundamentally different 
from the experience of the past and the future (Smolin, 91). While Immanuel Kant who defended the pre-
eminent status of mathematics in science, understood the logic of the argument that this implied a 
deterministic block universe, observed that science takes as objective knowledge the answers to questions 
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posed in terms of concepts that are brought to experience by a transcendental ego and by mathematics 
which, he argued, is a human construct. Consequently, it is only the world as it appears to us that science 
portrays, and not reality in itself. In each case, what has been recognized is that such objectivism implies 
a perspective to uphold it that is itself not comprehensible through this objectivism. Kant’s whole 
philosophy was an effort to confront the problem that the apparently objective world is in some sense 
created by the knower, who transcends the known and appreciates there must be a reality beyond that 
which is constructed, the noumenal realm - which includes the knower, without this knower having the 
means to gain cognitive access to this realm of things in themselves. The objectivists, such as Bolzano 
and Frege, rejected Kant’s questioning of objectivism, and attempted to rigorously defend objectivism. 
The outcome was an initial triumph of their objectivism in logic, mathematics and science, but it ended in 
a forced retreat from such claims. This led to the development of endophysics, resonating with and 
supporting the conclusions of those promoting naturalized phenomenology. 
Endophysics deals with physical systems from within, ‘allowing also observational processes as partial 
physical processes. This involves the phenomena of self-reference, and of introspection’ (Löfren, 1993, 
54). The term has a narrower sense as the study of any domain in which the observer is part of the 
observed, and a broader sense as modeling systems that include in the models ‘observers’; that is, 
subsystems that interact with the rest of the system (Kampis, 1991, 192ff., Kampis, 1993, 20, Rössler, 
1998, 29ff.). With this broader sense in mind, George Kampis emphasized that ‘endophysics is not about 
observers, even though it has been formulated with reference to observer problems. Endophysics is about 
the local and internal communication and interaction between processes, observers or otherwise’ 
(Kampis, 1993, 35). This suggests that endophysics could involve observing from outside a system that 
has local and internal communication and interaction between processes. However, the two senses of 
endophysics cannot be entirely separated, since in observing systems with internal communication and 
interaction, observations of these are inevitably part of what is being observed and so part of the system 
that they are striving to understand, and the system which includes them is an instance of a system with 
an internal observer. This is the case with a scientist studying the universe, or studying the global 
ecosystem, or studying language. It is also the case when examining an organism which requires us to 
take into into account that we are part of its world. This means that we have to acknowledge that we 
cannot transcend time and are observing the world at a particular time, and are subject to the same 
constraints as the system being studied. As Kampis put it, ‘”Now” is not a place in time, but an 
endophysical relation between an observer and a system’ (Kampis, 1993, 21). Here the parallels and 
resonances with Merleau-Ponty’s conclusion based on phenomenology, that we are only able to know the 
world through being embodied in a particular time and place, and in doing so find ourselves within an 
englobing nature in which there are other beings experiencing the same world, should be evident. 
However, to clarify these parallels we will begin by looking at the broader sense of endophysics and the 
implications of this, and because of its role in promoting an anti-humanist objectivism, it is first necessary 
to look at mathematics. 
Once the primacy of endoscience has been appreciated, it becomes necessary to redefine the role of 
exoscience. Exoscience seeks to transcend the limits of endoscience by constructing models and using 
easy to handle representations rather than direct observations. Exoscience always involves abstraction, in 
practice and in theory, from a context that has boundary conditions that in most instances are controlled 
by the researcher. Once the subordinate status of exoscience to endoscience is recognized, it becomes 
necessary to redefine the goal of exoscience. Apart from providing the knowledge required to develop 
technology, which as Heidegger pointed out, is a goal it is oriented to fulfill, its goal should not be seen as 
explaining away the reality of life but as comprehending how the emergent realities brought into focus by 
endoscience (including phenomenology) are possible.  
Endophysics and Mathematics 
Central to Pythagorean/Parmenidean objectivism has been the status accorded to mathematics. The 
proponents of Pythagorean/Parmenidean objectivism are committed to denying the reality of temporal 
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becoming, because they are committed to viewing mathematics, and later, logic along with it, as a purely 
objective language beyond any perspective on it, and they believe it is this language alone that can define 
what is true. This is an exophysical perspective.  
Not all those who value mathematics draw these conclusions, however. Logicians and mathematicians 
have always been divided over whether they interpret what they are dealing with is a universal language 
(lingua universalis) or as a calculus (calculus ratiocinator). While Bolzano, Frege and Russell were 
logicians committed to the former view and were attempting to develop a universal language, De Morgan, 
Boole, Peirce and Schoeder were committed to the latter (Hintikka 1996). Johannes Lenhard and Michael 
Otte have pointed out that this same division occurs among mathematicians (some of whom are also 
logicians). As they characterized this opposition: 
One group, from Leibniz through Bolzano to the analytical philosophers of the Vienna Circle and their students 
today, believe in an analytic ideal of mathematics ruled by formal proof and logical necessity. … Others, from 
Descartes, Newton and Kant though Peirce and quite a number of modern mathematicians, value insight higher 
than proof and believe that evidence rules over rigor (Lenhard and Otte, 2010, 311) 
Husserl, in opposition to Frege, viewed logic as a calculus, not a universal language (Kusch, 1989), and 
Whitehead also dissociated himself from the view of logic as a universal language (Whitehead, 1948, 
104). Those who look upon mathematics as a calculus are interested in the insights it provides in 
particular domains, appreciating the limited nature of their insights, and have no reason to assume that 
objectivity implies a Pythagorean/Parmenidean view of the world. Nor is there any reason for them to 
deny the constructive role of thought in achieving what insight is gained, or to assume that nature must be 
devoid of anthropomorphic elements.  
The quest to rigorously defend the view of mathematics and logic as a universal language evolved from 
Hilbert (who was relatively uninterested in logic) to Frege, who criticized Hilbert for being insufficiently 
rigorous. Frege strove to reduce arithmetic to logic. Russell (and at one time, Whitehead) attempted to 
reduce strove to reduce all mathematics to logic. Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem, directed against the 
formalism of Hilbert and logicism of Frege and Russell, was fatal to this quest for a universal language.   
While Gödel himself was concerned to defend a Platonic view of mathematics, Robert Rosen in a 
conference on endophysics drew different conclusions from Gödel’s work. Rosen was developing 
modeling theory through category theory (which, he argued, comprises within itself a general theory of 
modeling).  
Category theory has been briefly characterized by Ehresmann and Vanbremeersch as ‘a universal 
semantics of mathematical structures’ (p.26). It enables us to see the universal components of a family of 
structures of a given kind, how the structures of different kinds are interrelated, and to examine the 
mutability and admissible transformations of precisely defined structures. Structures are ‘lists of 
operations and their required properties, commonly given as axioms, and often so formulated as to be 
properties, shared by a number of possibly quite different specific mathematical objects’ (Mac Lane, 
1996, 174). A category has been defined as ‘a composite item consisting of a graph and an internal law 
which associates an arrow of the graph to each path of the graph, called its composite, and which satisfies 
some axioms given further on’ (Ehresmann and Vanbremeersch, 25f.). Category theory began with the 
observation that many properties of mathematical systems can be unified and simplified through a 
presentation with a diagram of arrows between ‘objects’ (which can be sets, groups or rings, or can be 
unspecified), where each arrow represents a function. The most important property of these arrows is that 
they can be ‘composed’, that is, arranged in a sequence to form a new arrow. The focus is then not on 
‘objects’, but on the structure preserving mappings or ‘morphisms’ between these ‘objects’ (Rosen, 1991, 
143ff.). These mappings, which reveal the possible transformations of structures, can themselves be 
studied in this way. If the structures are themselves categories so that the morphisms revealing possible 
transformations are between categories, these are referred to as ‘functors’, and are represented as arrows 
between the categories. There can also be a category of functors. The morphisms that transform one 
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functor into another while respecting the internal structure of the categories involved, thereby bringing 
into focus their mutability, are ‘natural transformations’. 
Rosen’s conception of mathematics and its relation to science, is based on his development of category 
theory as a general theory of modeling. He argued that in fact most mathematics has some referent to 
something external to the formalism itself, and so is ‘applied’ mathematics. Modeling is the judicious 
association of a formalism with these external referents (Rosen, 1993a, 359). However, category theory 
makes explicit and clarifies the nature of this modeling relation. Rosen characterized categories as formal 
systems, morphisms as entailment structures, and natural transformations as explicit modeling of one 
system by another (Rosen, 1991, 147). He then argued that from material systems we can abstract out 
‘natural systems’ which can be modeled in the same way as formal systems are modeled. Modeling 
natural systems in this way is really hypothesizing via abstractions about their elements and entailment 
structures to establish congruence between formal systems and these natural systems. This involves 
carefully delineating observables and linkage relations of the natural systems. There can be no mechanical 
algorithm for doing this, it is inescapably an art. Once this congruence has been established successfully, 
we can learn about the modeled system by studying the model of it. This involves using encoding and 
decoding arrows, along with ‘dictionaries’, to translate back and forth between the two systems, with 
measurement being a form of encoding and tracing causal entailments being a form of decoding.  
When examining the variety of entailment structures Rosen argued that modern science, under the 
influence of Newtonian science, has proscribed the kinds of observations, relations and models with 
complex forms of entailments characteristic of living organisms. Rosen’s main concern was to develop 
mathematics and to reconceive the goal of science to do justice to the reality of life itself. This involved 
advancing a tradition of natural philosophy inspired by Kant’s ‘Critique of Judgment’ and the work of 
Friedrich Schelling (Gare, 2011, Gare, 2013). Category theory as conceived by Rosen can be interpreted 
as a major development of the Whiteheadian/Peircian conception of mathematics - as the study through 
abstraction of possible patterns of connectedness and their transformations utilizing iconic signs or 
diagrams (Zalamea, 2010, 219ff.). Its potential has been tapped by Andrée Ehresmann and Jean-Paul 
Vanbremeersch in developing their model of Memory Evolutive Systems (2007). These systems are multi-
scale, multi-agent and multi-temporal and analyse changes from an ‘endo’ perspective through a net of 
internal agents acting as co-regulators. Involving a family of categories indexed over time, these are able 
to model a complexification process internally selected by the net of co-regulators capable of creativity 
(Ehresmann and Vanbremeersh, 2007, and Ehresmann and Simeonov, 2012). Rosen’s work has also been 
a source of inspiration for the development of non-reductionist biomathematics, or ‘integral biomathics’, 
exemplified in Simoenov (2010). A major anthology on integral biomathics has been published, edited by 
Simeonov, Smith and Ehresmann (2012) along with a previous edition of Progress in Biophysics & 
Molecular Biology edited by Simeonov, Matsuno and Root-Bernstein (2013).  
Based on this way of understanding mathematics, Rosen argued that Gödel’s theorem is just another 
foundation crisis for mathematics, due to it having taken a fateful wrong turn with Pythagoras (Rosen, 
1993). Pythagoras had attempted to reduce geometry to arithmetic, equating effectiveness with an 
iteration procedure such as counting; that is, computation. It was this assumption that led to Zeno’s 
paradoxes and the crippling of mathematics for millennia. The basic problem is assuming that the simple 
procedures adequate to simple domains of mathematics, which are adequate for modeling very limited 
domains of reality, are adequate to more complex domains and can define acceptable procedures. This 
underpins the quest for formalization, and over and over again, it has failed. More recent efforts in this 
direction involve efforts to eliminate semantics from mathematics and to reduce mathematics to 
syntactical operations without outside reference. Rosen noted the consequence of this: ‘once inside such a 
universe … we cannot get out again, because all the original external referents have presumably been 
pulled inside with us. … Once inside, we can claim “objectivity”; we can claim independence from any 
external context, because there is no external context anymore’ (Rosen, 1993b, 115).   
Most mathematics is not formalizable through axioms as Hilbert called for. For Rosen, what Gödel 
showed was that the model of arithmetic, developed by Frege, Russell and Whitehead using set theory 
and logic, is less rich than arithmetic. Arithmetic is ‘soft science’ relative to the ‘hard science’ of set 
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theory and logic, just as arithmetic is less rich than what is modeled by it, the richness of which is better 
captured by the ‘soft’ disciplines of the humanities and by the arts (Rosen, 1991, 9f.). With modeling, this 
will always be the case. The modeling relation, where something is learned about one system by studying 
another which is analogous to it, is ubiquitous and characteristic of everyday life as well as of both 
theoretical and experimental science (Rosen, 2012, 82). It is the failure to appreciate this that has led to 
the belief that objectivity implies the reduction of biology to chemistry and physics. As Rosen diagnosed 
the source of this problem: 
[T]hese ideas [that every model of a material process must be formalizable] have become confused with 
objectivity and hence with the very fabric of the scientific enterprise. Objectivity is supposed to mean observer 
independence, and more generally, context independence. Over the course of time this has come to mean only 
building from the smaller to the larger, and reducing the larger to the smaller. … In any large world, such as 
the one we inhabit, this kind of identification is in fact a mutilation, and it serves only to estrange most of what 
is interesting from the realm of science itself (1993, 118). 
Once this is realized we can not only free ourselves from the spell of the Pythagorean/Parmenidean ideal 
of science, reveal further aspects of its incoherence and free science to acknowledge the reality of life and 
mind and to develop mathematics more adequate to life, but also recognize the limits of mathematics and 
the role and validity of non-mathematical conceptualizations and models that acknowledge some measure 
of indeterminacy in the present and openness to the future.  
Reintroducing ‘Possibilities’ into Nature 
One pathway beyond the Pythagorian dream concerns the question of what to make of Possibles. Can 
they be “ontologically real”, as for example, Whitehead proposed in Process and Reality?  And Peirce 
centered his views on what we will here call, “Possibles”and “Actuals”, his “facticity”, and, in his case 
“laws”. We follow him, (Peirce 1902), and Whitehead concerning Possibles and Actuals, albeit on a 
somewhat different track.  
 
A central feature of classical physics is that it takes itself to be discussing only “Actuals”, i.e. events 
that do or do not actually happen.  In this world view, that of Newton, or later, Einstein in Special and 
General Relaitivity, the becoming of the world is entirely determined and is what actually happens, 
Pierce’s “facticity” our “Actuals”. Were we to try to talk of what “might have happened”, that talk is 
nonsense, for the world can only become in the specific way that it became given the initial and boundary 
conditions and Newton’s laws, or Special Relativity and even General Relativity.  
This framework denies the possibility of free will, let alone consciousness and qualia, hence 
phenomenology. Free will requires that “we could, contrary to fact, have “chosen hence done” 
otherwise”. This means that “the present could have been different”. But the specific becoming of the 
actual world in classical physics cannot have been otherwise given the initial and boundary conditions 
and laws of motion of the system.  
But we have missed something subtle in classical physics. Possibles, unstated, are central to it: 
Consider the billiard table and the edges which constitute the boundary conditions we use to integrate 
Newton’s equations. Now think of a modest number of rolling balls rolling for, say, a few minutes on the 
table, bouncing off the edges of the table. In fact, the balls will only touch the edges of the table at a small 
number of specific points and, by the third law, rebound. But in using the edge of the table as the 
“boundary conditions” we are asserting that “were the balls to hit at other places than they did hit, they 
would have behaved as predicted by Newton’s laws. But “Were” and “Would Have” are what are called 
“conditionals contrary to fact”. They are Modal logic terms about what Might happen or Might have 
happened. But modal terms like were, Would, Might, concern what is possible. The boundary conditions 
CREATE  the very phase space of “all possible positions and momenta of the particles”!  
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In the case above, however, the Newtonian behavior of the particles is “causal”, and General Relativity 
concerns causally linked events in space-time. However the famous Second Law of Thermodynamics in 
statistical mechanics, (Boltzmann), rest fundamentally on an even stronger appeal to The Possible”. This 
appeal is the famous “Ergodic Hypothesis”, for example for N particles in a liter box. Each can have its 
position and momenta defined by six numbers, thus there is a 6N dimensional phase space broken into 
tiny 6N dimensional “microstates”. A “macrostate” consists in a set of microstates. Some macrostates 
have few microstates, others have many. The Ergodic Hypothesis entirely give up integrating Newton’s 
laws of motion for the N particles and simply asserts: The system will spend “equal time in equal 
volumes of state space”. But there are NO CAUSES in the Ergodic Hypothesis. But to spend “equal time 
in equal volumes” it must be POSSIBLE to spend equal time in equal volumes! Without the hypothesis, 
the second law cannot be deduced for it is: The system will tend to flow from macrostates with fewer 
microstates to those with more microstates. Taking the “entropy” of a macrostate to the logarithm of the 
number of its microstates, entropy “tends to increase”, the very Second Law. Thus, without the non-
causal Ergodic Hypothesis which must appeal to the “reality of possibles”, there is no way to derive the 
Second Law! Classical physics, in its state spaces given boundary conditions and the Ergodic hypothesis 
depends  upon the reality of Possibles.  
 
What this shows is that the conditions for this form of science are the capacity to set up such boundary 
conditions and to envisage different possibilities. This in turn, implies that it is possible to set up 
boundary conditions and it is conceivable that different possibilities could be realized.  Any physicist in 
fact believes that he/she could construct a billiard table with a different shape, hence boundary condition, 
and “could have done otherwise”. Physicists assume responsible free will to act as exophysicists, then 
deny that assumption! Such science, the traditional approach of exophysics, is important, but limited. 
As Smolin points out (2013), physicsits typically divide the universe into the system and the rest of the 
universe. Clearly the universe as a whole cannot be studied by setting up boundary conditions because we 
cannot get outside it to control its boundary conditions. We have to study it from the inside as part of it, 
and in fact, we cannot completely step outside what we are studying because we to some extent are 
involved with and partially create what we study, even in the “simple case” of building a billiard table. 
The study of systems from an internal perspective is endophysics. What can be observed as a participant 
within a system is different from what can be observed from an external perspective.  
 
More, there is an inevitable “Subjective Pole” component to the “doing” of exophysics as in choosing 
the boundary conditions.  Robert Rosen pointed out that science at its most basic level involves making 
discriminations, thereby creating dualisms. The most basic discrimination made by all scientists, Rosen 
argued, is between the self and everything else, which Rosen referred to as the ambience (Rosen, 1991, 
40). Discriminating oneself from one’s ambience, which is fundamentally phenomenological, the 
foundation on which all other discriminations are based, requires one to accept that this is a division 
within the world encompassing both oneself and the ambience. The proponents of endophysics have 
understood this, and as a consequence, regard endophysics as more basic to science than exophysics, 
although exophysics can reveal aspects of reality that those inside a system cannot possibly see.  
Newton’s laws, the initial triumph of exophysics, describe the solar system very well, although done 
better in General Relativity. 
The Confluence of Endophysics and Naturalized Phenomenology 
In recognizing this, work on endophysics converges with, supports and clarifies Merleau-Ponty’s 
conclusion that we as flesh are within and part of an englobing nature that is also flesh; more primordial 
than and the condition for the emergence of subjects and objects. This involves recognizing that nature is 
simultaneously observing and observed and in process of becoming. But to get to this view we must 
surpass classical physics in which the world of actuals happen whether or not observed. We will appeal to 
Quantum Mechanics below. If successful, we also converge with Polanyi’s observation, further developed 
21 
 
by Pattee and other hierarchy theorists, that not only does scientific investigation of nature involves 
setting up boundary conditions for studying particular phenomena, but that we are only able to do this 
because we ourselves are not outside the world free of the constraints governing what we are 
investigating. Our very existence involves a whole hierarchy of extra facilitative constraints. The 
constraints on cells maintaining bodily form are the basis of the freedom of action of the individual as a 
multi-celled organism. The constraints of language are what facilitate complex forms of communication. 
It is such constraints that make scientists and scientific inquiry possible. 
The implications of this confluence of naturalized phenomenology and endophysics are most clearly 
manifest when the role of measurement in science is considered. Measurement cannot be treated in 
abstraction from other aspects of scientific activity, such as what is involved in recognition of patterns, 
discrimination and classification. However, given these other aspects, measurement is, as Rosen argued, 
‘both the basis for our concrete knowledge of the physical world and the point of departure for the 
formation of conceptual structures (models) which organize this knowledge and enable us to predict and 
control (Rosen, 1978, ix). In exophysics, as exemplified by Newtonian science, it is assumed that 
measurement is completely separate from what is being examined. As physics has advanced beyond 
Newtonian science, measurement has had to be taken into account as part of what is being examined. 
Measurement, recognition, discrimination and classification depend on the capacity of a system to induce 
dynamics (a change of state) in another system, and this relationship has to be acknowledged. For 
instance, in thermodynamics it had been suggested by Clark Maxwell that increased entropy could be 
avoided by a demon observing particles in motion and selectively choosing which particles to be allowed 
to pass through a door. What Maxwell had forgotten was the entropy generated by making observations 
and opening and closing a door, and observation is now recognized as something that has to be taken into 
account in the study of thermodynamics. While the general theory of relativity and quantum cosmology 
appear to be strongholds of anti-humanist objectivism, Einstein’s initial concern had been with the 
problem of establishing simultaneity in OBSERVATIONS, essential to the experimental study of physical 
systems. He took the special theory of relativity to imply the primacy of becoming and the derivative 
place of space, as there is never any question about the direction of temporal becoming within any 
reference frame. And the theory is incompatible with determinism because the future of a particular 
reference system is affected by the variables ‘elsewhere’, outside the past light cone of the system of 
interest, that cannot be fully known but affects events in the later and future light cone of that system, 
(Bohm, 1965, 180ff, Bohm and Hiley, 1993, Popper, 1988.). Interpreted in this way, different 
perspectives can be seen to have an objective status, while a God’s eye perspective is ruled out. It is 
possible to extend this way of interpreting the special theory of relativity theory to the general theory. 
Interpreting the geometry as a mapping of the events in the world, their potential for independence and 
interaction between reference frames and from there to more recent developments in quantum cosmology 
(Čapek, 1961, 175ff.). This is affirmed by Lee Smolin’s efforts to reformulate cosmology in a way that 
privileges time and treats space as emergent (Smolin, 2013, 172ff.).  
 
However, it is in quantum mechanics that the significance of quantum measurement has become 
central to science and which justifies a conception of being that is neither observer not observed, more 
primordial than either and the condition of both. Endophysics began with reflection on quantum theory, 
and has continued to develop through such reflection (Buccheri et.al., 2005). Here we will propose a new, 
perhaps the fifteenth, version of quantum theory, which both acknowledges the impossibility of 
construing reality independent of the measurement process, but then takes this measurement process to be 
an essential feature of what there is.  
From Quantum Measurement to an Enveloping Nature of Creative Processes 
In outline: we shall offer a new interpretation of quantum mechanics, then below a new view of the 
evolution of life, both, of which are entirely open-ended GENUINE EMERGENT BECOMING, in the 
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spirit of Pierce above, but, unlike Pierce, entailed by no law, where radical emergence is real and where 
we regain our Subjective Pole in a participatory universe that ever becomes with a Subjective Pole “all 
the way down”. What we shall say about quantum mechanics is a cousin of the position of Sir Roger 
Penrose and Stuart Hameroff, Orchestrated Objective Reduction (Orch OR) (Penrose 1989, 1994). We 
and they propose that whenever quantum measurement happens in the universe, bursts of consciousness 
and free will doings arise in that measurement, sometimes called “the collapse of the wave function”. 
Penrose and Hameroff (ibid) propose that spacetime itself splits into two or more superpositions of 
“possible” structures of spacetime, then via self gravitational effects, measurement “happens at a time Eg 
=h/t, where h is Planck’s constant,  t is time and Eg is self gravitation We state in preliminary form an 
alternative view, “The Triad”, in a moment, where conscious free willed “mind” itself acausally is both 
necessary and sufficient anywhere in the universe to carry out measurement. (There is preliminary 
evidence that distant human consciousness can mediate measurement, Radin (2012, 2103, described 
further below.) Radically, on either Orch OR or the Triad, the universe is vastly participatory, with some 
form of “cosmic consciousness”, hence qualia and phenomenology, and something like protoresponsible 
free will “doings” every time measurement happens!  If so, the universe, all of life, and we with life, are 
choosing, in part, what the universe and we are becoming.  
 
The above pictures, Orch Or, (ibid) and “The Traid” also needs an account of the “classical world”. If 
not we cannot be “embodied” Physics accepts quantum mechanic and quantum field theory and the 
classical physics of General Relativity, but has as yet no agreed upon account of what the classical world 
might be and how it may emerge from quantum mechanics.  
We mention at least three ideas, among more, about what the classical world is, given Quantum 
Mechanics, decoherence (Zurek), the ideas of Henry Stapp (Stapp), and the possibility that the classical 
world rests on what is called the Quantum Zeno Effect, (Kauffman 2014, 2015b). These hypotheses are 
testable. Importantly, the “standard interpretation” of quantum mechanics, The Copenhagen interpretation 
largely crafted by Bohr, assumes the world “just is” both quantum and classical. von Neumann in his 
foundational book on quantum mechanics and measurement, (von Neumann 1933), struggles with these 
issues. General Relativity and Quantum Mechanics remain ununited since their discoveries in 1916 and 
1927. String theory, and loop quantum gravity are two major attempts to quantize General Relativity. 
Neither has yet succeeded; but may yet.  
The Triad 
We shall here build towards a new view of quantum mechanics which may solve a number of problems 
at its foundations: Actuals that are ontologically real and defined as obeying Aristotle’s law of the 
excluded middle, Possibles which are ontologically real and are defined as not obeying the law of the 
excluded middle, and Mind, consciousness with qualia, and free will doings at measurement. In short: res 
potentia, res extensa linked by “mind” at measurement.  
Quantum superpositions do not obey the law of the excluded middle. This is captured in the 
Schrodinger Cat mystery in which the Cat is “simultaneously dead and alive” until we “look” in the box  
holding it to see if quantum random release of a particle has killed it. But “The cat is simultaneously dead 
and alive” is a contradiction, so does NOT obey Aristotle’s law of the excluded middle. Pierce pointed 
out that actuals and probables do obey that law, but possibles do not. “The cat is simultaneously possibly 
dead and possibly alive” is not a contradiction. We will define ontologically real Possibles as “not 
obeying the law of the excluded middle” which characterize the wave behavior of quantum systems prior 
to measurement. Actuals, after measurement, DO obey the law of the excluded middle, for example the 
spot on the film in the two slit experiment. So measurement does convert from that which does not to that 
which does obey the law of the excluded middle. Our position is res potentia and res extensa, and 
measurement converts Possibles to Actuals.  
But how does measurement happen? Von Neumann, (von Neumann), proposed that human 
consciousness could suffice for measurement. Radin has weak evidence for this, (2012, 2013). If 
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confirmed human consciousness can be sufficient for measurement. If we come to believe or demonstrate 
that human consciousness can suffice for measurement, then we need to invent a way either classical 
devices, or such devices that are quantum at their base can measure. In a set of arguments based on 
Conway and Kochen’s “Strong Free Will Theorem” (Conway and Kochen), and “The Quantum Enigma, 
(Rosenblum and Kuttner), the simplest hypothesis is that quantum variables can consciously and with free 
will, measure one another, (Kauffman 2014, 2015b), and whatever the classical world may be, it is 
quantum at base and those quantum variables can measure consciously, so classical devices can measure 
as well, as von Neumann and most physicists want.  At present we see no way to test whether quantum 
variables can consciously measure. If that is true, then electrons measuring have free will (Conway and 
Kochen) and qualia, so have some form of phenomenology! 
 
 
Now the “Triad” consisting of Actuals, Possibles, and Mind” In this view, Mind measuring Possibles 
yields unentailed, new Actuals in the universe. New Actuals instantaneously and acausally yield new 
Possibles for Mind to measure acausally, creating again new Actuals that again acausally create new 
Possibles for Mind to measure.  This is a persistent emergent BECOMING. Nothing IS, all BECOMES, 
STATUS NASCENDI. Bergson’s Duration is real (Bergson ref). Peirce’s Possibles and Actuals = 
Facticity are real. Mind is real.  A central hypothesis is that conscious mind can measure. As noted above, 
there is very preliminary evidence that this may be true. D. Radin (Radin et. al. 2012, 2013), has early 
evidence using the famous two slit experiment, described below, that distant participants by 
concentrating, but not when not concentrating, and not robots, can affect measurement in the two slit 
experiment slightly but strongly statistically significantly. The effects on measurement are to shift the 
famous interference patterns of dark and light bands that arise in the two slit experiment, altering the ratio 
of “brightness” of adjacent dark and light bands. Each spot in these bands, whether recorded by a film 
emulsion or a CCD, the present case, is a single measurement event. Thus, to alter the ratio of dark and 
light band intensities is to alter measurement events. Thus Radin, (ibid), has the first very tentative 
evidence that mind can affect measurement, or “mediate” measurement.  
We have used Pierce to assert a new Dualism: res potentia, ontologically REAL possibiles that are 
defined as NOT obeying the law of the excluded middle, and res extensa, ontologically real 
Actuals, defined as obeying the law of the excluded middle, linked by measurement, in the Triad by mind 
measuring, converting Possibles to Actuals. Unlike Descartes’ res cogitans and res extensa, a substance 
dualism, res potentia and res extensa is NOT a substance dualism, because possibilities are not substances 
for they do not obey the law of the excluded middle, hence are not Actuals.  
 
Non Locality, Instantaneous Changes in Wave Functions, Which Way Information, and the 
Quantum Enigma. 
The postulate of ontologically real possibles seems strongly to answer four deep puzzles about 
quantum mechanics that all interpretations of quantum mechanics face: Non-locality, Instantaneous 
changes in wave functions, “which way information”, and aspects of the Quantum Enigma. 
In 1933, Podolsky and Rosen (Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen), published a paper meant to show the 
incompleteness of quantum mechanics. In QM, two or more variables can be “entangled, and no longer 
two independent variables, but they are described by a single Schrodinger “wave function.” Quantum 
Mechanics predicts that if two electrons are entangled and each, say, has by the Born rule, a 50% 
probability to be measured spin up or 50% probability to be measured spin down, then if one is measured 
“here” and found to be spin up, the other, WHICH MAY BE MILLIONS OF MILES AWAY, 
INSTANTANEOUSLY WILL BE MEASURED SPIN DOWN. But light travels at a finite speed, C, so 
this prediction of quantum mechanics violates special relativity. Einstein was apparently wrong. The 
experiment has been carried out many times, and the results are just what Quantum Mechanics predicts. 
But no information can travel faster than the speed of light, so no causal effects can account for the 
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correlations of the two measurement outcomes. Non-locality has been demonstrated up to 190 kilometers 
at this point.  The universe is NON LOCAL in the sense that no causal connection between the two 
entangled particles can account for the non-local observations. Physicists have no clear way to account for 
non-locality. Many struggle with “supraliminal acausal” influences.  
ONTOLOGICALLY REAL NEW ACTUALS ACAUSALLY AND INSTANENSOUSLY YIELD NEW 
POSSIBLES. 
We begin with classical physics and the two authors. We are going to meet at the store on J street 
tomorrow to buy orange juice. Today a sign goes up on the store on J street: “This store closed 
immediately!” What just happened to the possibility that we could meet at the store tomorrow? The 
possibility VANISHED, AND DID SO INSTANTEOUSLY AT THE MOMENT THE SIGN WENT UP, 
AND THE POSSIBLITY, GIVEN THIS NEW ACTUAL, VANISHED “ACAUSALLY”.  No billiard 
balls bounced on a billiard table as in Newton. If possibilities can be real, then a change in an Actual, if 
time is real up to Special Relativity, can acausally and instantaneously, change what is now possible.  
In Quantum mechanics, if res potentia is real, and possibilities are outside of space but inside of time 
up to special relativity, or inside of space and time up to Special Relativity and propagate as “real 
possibles” with the Schrodinger equation, we easily account for non-locality. The measurement of the 
first electron as “spin up” is a new in the universe ACTUAL that obeys the law of the excluded middle 
and acausally and instantaneously, changes the outcome for the second entangled electron. The possibility 
that the second electron can be measured to be spin up has VANISHED with the measurement of the first 
electron. Thus the second electron can only be measured as the one remaining possibility, spin 
down. More precisely, by symmetry of two entangled electrons, if the spin of one is up, the other must be 
down. There are only two possibilities. When the first electron is measured UP, that possibility for the 
second electron vanishes and thus the second electron can only be  measured spin down. If Possibles are 
outside of space but inside of time up to Special Relativity, and measurements must have outcomes, as 
Actuals, inside of space as well as time, we have an account of non-locality. If Possibles are inside of 
space and time up to Special Relativity and spread with the Schrodinger equation, we also have an 
explantion for non-locality: At time T the single wave function of the entangled particles propagates in 
space. At time T + tau the measurement of the first electron occurs. At time T + tau + e the measurement 
of the second electron occurs. But the interval, “e”, between the first and the second measurement is too 
short for light to have traveled between the locations of the first and second measurement, so the 
correlations of the two measurements are non-local. 
The view: res potentia res extensa linked by (mind) measurement accounts for three other puzzles in 
quantum mechanics beyond non-locality. In QM, given N entangled particles, measurement of the first, 
INSTANTEOUSLY ALTERS THE WAVE FUNCTION HENCE THE AMPLITUDES OF THE 
REMAINING N - 1 PARTICLES hence their Born probabilities of measurement outcomes. How can 
anything causal, with the speed of light finite, C, INSTANTANEOUSLY alter amplitudes of the N - 1 
particles? Nothing causal can happen, (if measurement is real, hence not on Bohm, (Bohm).). But 
measurement of the first particle yields a new in the universe Actual that can instantaneously and 
acausally change what is now possible, hence change the possibles comprising the wave function. 
A third puzzle in QM, an aspect of the quantum enigma, (Rosenblum and Kutter), discussed more fully 
below, is that if we prepare an electron to be in a superposition in box 1 and simultaneously in box 2, like 
the CAT, and we look in box 1 and  do NOT find the electron in box 1, it is instantaenously “measured” 
to be in box 2, despite the fact that no one looked in box 2. How can that be? If possibles are real, there 
were two possibilities, the electron in box 1 and simultaneously in box 2. If I or we look in box 1 and it is 
via “my conscious observation of it, measured to be NOT there, that possibility is eliminated and the 
remaining possibility is that it now IS in box 2. Confirmed without conscious measurement.  
A fourth puzzle, “which way information”, is an aspect of the two slit experiment: In brief here, at 
last, is the two slit experiment, probably the central experiment for which QM was invented. A screen 
with two slits is erected, with a film emulsion or CCD behind it. One slit, the left, say, is covered. A 
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flashlight shines light through the open right slit and the film or CCD records a bright spot behind the 
open right slit. Now cover the right slit, again shine the flashlight through the now open left slit, and a 
bright spot will be recorded on the film or CCD behind the now open left slit.  
Now open both slits! What happens is the central mystery of QM. One does not get two bright spots, 
but a series of light and dark bands on the film or CCD, spanning between where the two bright spots 
would have been. This set of bands is the famous interference pattern. It is this pattern that Radin (Radin 
et. al. 2012, 2013) is finding, with still tentative evidence, can be slightly altered by distant people 
attending to the pattern and “trying” to alter the ratio intensity of adjacent light and dark bands.  
Stunningly, if one tunes the flashlight now so one photon an hour passes through the two open slits and 
accumulates the spots, the same interference pattern is found! So the “weird behavior” is true of single 
photons. This mystery is that the photon behaves like a wave before being measured, and a particle when 
measured and a, say spot, arises on the film emulsion. To explain the “wave like” behavior picture 
parallel water waves approaches from seaward, a sea wall with two slits, passing through them and 
yielding semicircular waves propagating from each slit in the sea wall toward the beach. Let these wave 
trains overlap. Walk along the beach. At some points the crests of waves from the left and right slits in the 
sea wall arrive at the same point on the beach and the crests sum to a higher crest. This corresponds to a 
bright spot on the film. At other spots on the beach, two valleys from left and right slits in the wall arrive 
at the same spot on the beach and also correspond to bright spots. But between these spots, the crest of 
one wave, say from the left slit in the wall, arrives where the valley of a wave from the right slit arrives, 
and the crest and valley CANCEL out, corresponding to the dark bands on the film or CCD.  
In the case of photons, or electrons or buckyballs, all showing the interference pattern, one says that the 
photon or electron or C60 Buckyball, simultaneously passes through both slits, in a “quantum coherent 
SUPERPOSITION”, like the dead and alive cat. This quantum coherent behavior of two or many 
superpositions is the WAVE behavior of quantum variables. Importantly, no one ever SEES this quantum 
superposition, we see only the results of measurement, the particle behavior of the photon, electron, or 
buckyball. This is the famous wave/ particle duality of quantum mechanics. 
Now as if that were not bad enough, if one mounts any instrument behind one of the two slits,  say the 
left one, “recording” which way the photon passes, the interference pattern DISAPPEARS! THIS IS 
“WHICH WAY INFORMATION”. How can which way information affect the interference pattern? ON 
RES POTENTIA, why does the interference pattern disappear? Because the measurement of the photon 
passing (or not) through the left slit, is a new Actual, that changes what is now possible instantaneously 
and acausally, hence removes one of the two (two slits) possibilities, and only one possibility remains, 
given this new Actual. If the photon Actually did go through the left slit, that removes the possibility that 
it went through the right slit.  So the interference pattern disappears. If the photon did NOT go through 
the left slit, the only possibility left by that new actual, is that the photon went through the right slit. 
In short, if possibles are real, we can account for four deep issues in quantum mechanics. On res 
potentia, for example superpositions, what is waving in the Schrodinger equation, are 
POSSIBILITIES.  Heisenberg has much the same view long ago, (Heisenberg), as did Deiter Zeh more 
recently, (Zeh).   
 
We know of no explanation for these four mysteries, that appear to be explained by ontologically real 
Possibles.  
Von Neumann’s Epistemic Cut 
von Neumann (von Neumann) struggled with this: a quantum system is to be  measured by a classical 
device, but the quantum system becomes entangled with classical system and the total entangled system 
remains QUANTUM. A further classical system now is to measure the first quantum system entangled 
with the first classical system, and this second measuring system also becomes entangled so remains 
quantum, in an infinite regress of measuring devices. To break this regress, von Neumann proposed that 
only consciousness can measure. Then he “waffled” and said maybe the classical instrument can measure, 
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placing an “epistemic cut at consciousness for measurement or at the classical apparatus or anywhere in 
between. Almost all physicists hold that “classical” devices can “record” hence measure, for example a 
cosmic ray leaves a track on mica and is measured.  Bohr, in conceiving of the Copenhagen interpretation, 
assumed both a quantum and a classical world, the latter somehow playing a role in measurement, as just 
noted. 
One possible answer, the one is to propose (Kauffman 2014, 2015, 2015b), is that classical systems are 
quantum at base and the quantum variables can consciously observe one another and so measure, as 
Radin (Radin et. al. 2012, 2013), is tentatively finding human consciouness may do. This is a huge step: 
IF WE CONVINCE OURSELVES THAT HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS CAN BE SUFFICIENT TO 
“MEDIATE” MEASUREMENT, AS RADIN’S RESULTS BEGIN TO SUGGEST, THEN EITHER WE 
INVENT SOME OTHER WAY THE CLASSICAL WORLD, WHATEVER IT IS, OR QUANTUM 
VARIABLES AT THE BASE OF THE QUANTUM WORLD CAN “MEDIATE MEASUREMENT BY 
CONSCIOUSLY OBSERVING ONE ANTOHER, SEE MORE BELOW, OR WE TRY THE IDEA 
THAT QUANTUM VARIABLES CAN CONSCIOUSLY MEASURE ONE ANOTHER, SAY BY 
FERMIONS EXCHANING BOSONS, (Kauffman 2014, 2015b).  
This proposal solves the epistemic cut issue of von Neumann. Direct evidence that electrons are 
consciosus at measurement seems impossible at present.  
The Quantum Enigma: We and Nature Jointly Co-Create Reality. 
Rosenblum and Kuttner, (Rosenblum and Kuttner), wrote The quantum enigma in a simplified form. 
Here it is: We can choose to prepare a system such that a single electron is in a superposition in box 1 and 
box 2. Then we look in box 1 and it is either in box 1 or not, hence comes to be IN box 2. We have 
measured 1 by looking in box 1. But if the electron is not in Box 1 it is and measured be in box 2 even 
though we did not look. But critically, we COULD HAVE CHOSEN, FREE WILLED, TO DO A 
DIFFERENT EXPERIMENT, we could have examined boxes 1 and 2 simultaneously and inferred a 
superpositon just like life and dead cat, or the interference pattern in the two slit experiment. We, free 
willed, ask one of two questions of nature, but could have asked the other question: i. yes or no, in box 1 
or two, ii. yes is there an interference pattern, and we confirm the interference pattern, hence questions I 
and ii yield a different reality! Thus, we by our choice of what experiment to do, what question to ask of 
Nature, but could contrary to fact, have asked the other question, and Nature’s answer and our 
measurement or inference, CHANGE REALITY!  THERE IS NO PREEXISTING REALITY, AND 
OUR FREE WILLED CHOICES AND CONSCIOUS OBSERVATIONS ALONG WITH NATURE, 
CHANGE WHAT “BECOMES REAL”. SEE ALSO STAPP, (STAPP) .  For the enigma to be real, it 
must be the case that we could have chosen to do the other experiment. Then the present could, contrary 
to fact, have been different. Ontologically, it is possible for the present to have been different if 
measurement is real and indeterminate, for the electron could now have been measured to be spin up or to 
be spin down, so the present could have been different. 
One solution to the Enigma, (Kauffman 2014, 2015b), is to push it all the way from us to electrons and 
protons exchanging photons, and consciously measuring one another with free will. The Conway Kochen 
Strong Free Will Theorem, (Conway Kochen), seems to establish that if we have free will, so does the 
electron which decides non-randomly to be measured spin up or spin down.  
Penrose and Hameroff, on different arguments, seem to want the same thing. As we understand their 
view, expressed in Penrose, (Penrose 1989, 1994), and Hameroff on line P.C to a discussion group, 
spacetime splits into two or more POSSIBILITIES, which by gravitational self interaction collapses at 
moment with a flash of consciousness and, it seems free will. On their view, like the Triad, consciousness 
and free will occurs whenever measurement happens. The Triad presumes free will happens on 
measurement too, so both, Orch OR, and Triad, have a vastly participatory universe with something like 
the start of : Cosmic mind and will whenever measurement happens!  
Either the Triad, (Kauffman, 2015b) or Orch Or, give us a universe where at each measurement flashes 
of consciousness, qualia, and free will occur. We then have mind and phenomenology all the way down. 
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Then we have the start of our Subjective Pole in a vastly participatory universe in which mind and free 
will are part of the becoming of all. If so, reductive materialism fails, for free will is real. More, on either 
the Triad or Orch OR, all is a becoming, not being. The outcomes of measurement change the world 
which then becomes again, based on the unentailed outcomes of measurement. The world 
becomes. Bergson’s Duree is real, (Bergson ref). So is Whitehead’s, (Whitehead). 
   
Human Mind-Body and Phenomenology 
All this provides support for the way nature is actually experienced, as Merleau-Ponty claimed, nature 
that does not stand over against us but of which we are part and are participating within. It is not a 
mechanical world of matter occupying Euclidean space and governed by immutable laws, as Newtonians 
led us to believe, but is an enveloping world that is active, with some measure of openness to the future. If 
measurement even at the quantum level in whatever the classical world may be, is “mediated acausally” 
by mind, conscious and free willed, then life, on earth for 3.7 billion years, did not evolve mind ab initio, 
but made use of it and presumably elaborated it to achieve the remarkable human mind. What is the 
experiential content of the human mind? How complex! Phenomenology, as in Merleau-Ponte (Merleau- 
Ponty) and others back to William James (James), have studied this. Thomas Nagle famously wrote, 
“What is it like to be a bat?”, (Nagel),  trying to show that consciousness is real, there IS something that it 
is LIKE to be a bat,whose phenomenology is presumably different than ours given the bat’s capacity for 
echolocation. But what, phenomenologically, what is it like to be E. coli, Stentor, Hydra, Anabena, yeast, 
a bush, tree, chimp or thee?  
Answering Descartes 
Descartes’ res cogitans and res extensa, a substance dualism, failed, for given the classical world of res 
extensa and Newton, the current state of the classical brain suffices for the next state of the brain. Then 
there is nothing for mind to do and no way for mind to do it. We have been frozen in this stalemate since 
Descartes and Newton due to the “causal closure” of classical physics. We need to go to quantum 
mechanics to break the Stalemate. Kauffman and colleagues, S. Niiranen, G. Vattay  have recently 
discovered The Poised Realm, (Kauffman et. al, 2014, Kauffman 2014, 2015, 2015b, Vattay et al, 2014, 
2015, Vattay and Csabai 2015), which hovers reversibly between quantum coherence and “classical” 
worlds via ACAUSAL decoherence and recoherence, both acausal, and measurement. The poised realm 
seems VERY real, and may explain how a quantum coherent and  poised realm and classical mind body 
allows the quantum and poised realm aspects to have ACAUSAL CONSEQUENCES, for whatever the 
classical “meat” of the brain / body may be. This breaks the causal closure of classical physics and is an 
answer to the Stalemate.  
 
The poised realm seems real, (ibid), and quantum effects such as long lived quantum coherence that 
decoheres slowly, is real in light harvesting molecules, (Engles et al.) in bird migration and smell, where 
smell may not be classical receptor ligand lock and key binding, but in part due to quantum 
oscillations.(Get). Partial grounds exist to think life is partly in the poised realm. For example, theory 
suggests receptor ligand complexes work better if partially coherent, (Vattay and Csabai). 
What is the Classical World?  
We have no accepted account of the classical world. If Merleau-Ponty, contra Husserl, (Husserl), wants 
EMBODIED PHENENOLOGY, we need a classical enough world to have a body. So does evolution, 
otherwise advantageous mutations could not accumulate adaptations. We mention again decoherence 
(Zurek), Stapp (Stapp), and Kauffman’s try, (Kauffman 2014, 2015b) based on the quantum Zeno effect. 
Here is the Quantum Zeno effect. Some quantum measurements yield a single wave function, hence an 
Actual, but not a stable spot (classical) of a film. Quantum theory says that the single wave function will 
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flower slowly, quadratically, in time, new waves. Initially these will be of tiny amplitudes, while the 
initial wave function is still of very high amplitudes so the Born rule is very likely to be the one measured 
if the system is rapidly remeasured. This is confirmed and is the Quantum Zeno Effect. Were 
remeasurements infinitely rapid, which is not possible, the propagation of the Schrodinger wave would be 
halted. Now Linus Pauling famously proposed that a covalent chemical bond is a SINGLE WAVE 
FUNCTION, say between an electron in one atom and proton in another, exchanging virtual or real 
photons. But we can then ask, “WHY DOES THE SINGLE WAVE FUNCTION OF THE CHEMICAL 
BOND NOT FLOWER NEW AMPLITUDES? A tentative answer is that the exchange of photons allows 
the proton and electron to remeasure one another rapidly enough to induce the Quantum Zeno effect, thus 
“co-trapping the proton and electron in a single “stable” wave function that creates the chemical 
bond.  Much of the classical world is made up of simple and complex molecules, from metals to 
Buckballs to lumps of coal to spots on film emulsion in the two slit experiment. The idea is that cross 
observation as the number of atoms in the “mass” increases, induces the Zeno effect ever more strongly, 
so a benzine molecule is less classical that a 50 kilogram lump of coal, which is a single molecule of 
many carbon atoms. This hypothesis seems testable. Can cross trapping by a Zeno effect for long times be 
confirmed?  Maybe.  
In short, the Triad is insufficient in itself. We need a classical world somehow, such as stable spots on 
film emulsions that last years. In quantum mechanics, the Schrodinger wave is set equal to a classical 
potential which is its boundary conditions and the waves must “fit” those boundary conditions. Change 
the boundary conditions and the quantum wave functions will change. Were there no stable classical 
enough world, evolution could not have worked. We advocate no refined idealism such as Berkeley or 
Hursserl (Husserl), but side with Merleau-Ponty, (Merleau-Ponty). 
The “classical world” presumably bears on the phenomenology of bats with echolocation and us with 
highly evolved sight, smell and so forth. Our brain stems, amygdala, limbic system and forebrains are 
largely classical neural structures that evolved with respect to our emotions.  
 
The views above suggest a naturalized phenomenology all the way down in a becoming universe. We 
turn next to the unprestatable, radical emergence of life and mind in the evolution of the biosphere; hence 
to an open ended becoming of an embodied naturalized phenomenology. 
The Origin and Unprestatable Emergent Evolution of Life 
Any human phenomenology rests on the emergence and evolution of life, here on earth, embodied 
life. If panpsychism is right on Orch Or,  (Penrose 1989, 1994) or the Triad as two possibilities, then mind 
is in the furniture of the universe and life started with mind and mind evolved with life. Phenomenology 
has been with us for 3.7 billion years on earth and perhaps on some of the 10 to the 21st stars that have 
exoplanets and perhaps life. 
No one knows how life originated. Briefly there are four views now contending, giving a primordial 
soup of organic molecules due to abiotic synthesis on earth, infall of comets and meteorites on the early 
earth, or both. The first view, the RNA world view, started with the observation that DNA is a double 
helix, and so is its cousin, RNA. The hope has been that one side of the double helix, say the Crick side, 
could, without enzymes, line up free building blocks called nucleotides, and link them into the second, 
Watson strand; the two melt apart and cycle, creating a replicating RNA or RNA like polymer. For many 
reasons, this has not worked for 40 years, but still may, (Orgel and Lohrman). A second view is that life 
started with budding hollow lipid vessicles called liposomes, which do occur, (Daemer and Barchfield). A 
third view is the spontaneous emergence of sets of molecules, say RNA or small proteins called peptides, 
or both, which mutually catalyze one antoher’s formation from some outside building blocks, (Kauffman 
1971, 1986, 1993, 1995, Hordijk et al, 2010, 2011, 2012). Call these collectively autocataltyic sets. This 
has succeeded to a substantial extent with DNA, RNA, and peptide CAS. Ashkenasy, (Wagner and 
Ashkensay),  for example has a 9 peptide collectively autocatalytic set reproducing in his lab in Israel. 
The fourth view, the Chemotron (Ganti) by T Ganti, proposes a bounding membrane with a  metabolism 
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inside and some form or reproducing polymers, eg RNA world-like, inside. It seems likely that some form 
of protocell, perhaps a CAS inside a liposome that can bud, making the lipids needed to form more 
liposome, can be made in the next decades. If so we will have created some early protocell, and have 
good grounds to think that it can evolve, even before DNA encoded protein synthesis via the genetic code 
emerged. That code, a major issue, enabled wide exploration of DNA, RNA and protein space and 
thereby did not cause, but enabled enormously more rapid evolution.  We can hope that we will have 
created protolife soon. 
If the Triad or Orch OR are correct, mind is throughout the universe, hence was part of life from the 
outset. More the Poised Realm is real, and may be part of life from the outset. If so, qualia and mind 
and embodied phenomenology are all parts of the evolution of the biosphere. With this comes AGENCY, 
sensing the world, evaluating it as “good or bad for me”, and thence doing in the world. Hence emotion to 
evaluate, linked with some forms of “knowing and acting in the world”, (Peil), major issues in the 
emergence and evolution of phenomenology. The extent to which mind, via niche construction and more, 
has played a role in evolution is very poorly explored.  
As we saw, the Pythagorean dream and Newton gave us Reductive Materialism where all that becomes 
is entailed. Does this view hold for the evolution of life? We claim No, for no law entails the becoming of 
the biosphere, (Kauffman, Longo et al. 2012, Kauffman 2015b). 
We shall try to show that this view of an entailed becoming is profoundly wrong for the evolving 
biosphere. In place of an entailed becoming we shall find a new explanatory framework: The evolution of 
the biosphere is describable by no entailing laws at all. Nor is such evolution even mathematizable in any 
known way. Instead, new in the universe, and typically unprestatable, Actuals (the term defining the 
existing and not merely potential or possible) arise. These actuals constitute new in the universe, 
unprestatable boundary conditions that are “enabling constraints” that literally create new in the universe 
and unprestatable “Adjacent Possible Opportunities”, into which evolution “becomes” with the radical 
emergence of yet new Actuals. In turn these unprestatable Actuals create new unprestatable Adjacent 
Possibles into which evolution becomes creating yet new Actuals in a continuous, beyond entailing law, 
largely unprestatable becoming. Indeed we will find that evolution creates the very possibilities into 
which it becomes, without natural selection “acting” to achieve these new adjacent possibilities. 
Evolution is radical, ongoing, co-creativity.  
What we shall say has many implications. First, we often cannot even know what can happen. Then we 
can form no statistical probability distributions for we do not know the sample spaces of the Adjacent 
Possibles. Harder, “sufficient reason” fails. We cannot reason about what we cannot know. Then Reason, 
the highest human virtue of the Greeks and our Enlightenment, is an insufficient guide for understanding, 
predicting, or living our lives forward. In turn, our model of the scientific method, based on physics: laws, 
deduction of new consequences given those laws, confirming or, with Popper, (Popper), falsifying those 
predictions, fails. We have no laws from which to make the predictions. We need new ways to “do 
science”, when we cannot know what can happen. In truth, we already do science when we do not know 
beforehand what can happen. We do this all the time in our historical approach to evolution, as in 
paleontology, where we reconstruct the past from “the Record”. We do history, and the patterns of 
evolution we seek are those revealed in a history that is entailed by no laws of motion.  
Darwin hoped to be the Newton of biology. Kant said there will be no Newton of biology. Kant was 
right and Darwin and evolution is the end of the hegemony of Newton and Reductive Materialism in our 
understanding of science and the world at large, surely for the evolution of life, and for the universe as a 
whole on Orch Or, (Penrose 1989 1994) or the Triad.  
 
Further, if no law entails the evolution of the universe with mind as part of it, or no law entails the 
evolution of the biosphere with mind as part of it, then the evolution of mind and phenomenology is 
governed by no entailing law!  We must study this radical emergence retrospectively, rather like 
paleontology and history. 
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From Phenomenology and Endophysics to Endobiology: Patterns in the 
Evolution of Life 
The convergence of naturalized phenomenology and endophysics not only transcends Cartesian 
dualism, it also transcends Idealism and more importantly, as far as science is concerned, the form of 
objectivism that identifies true knowledge with a logico-mathematical order that denies reality to 
temporality and emergence and thereby to life and mind. Exophysics, while having a major role in 
gaining knowledge where boundary conditions can be found or set up to allow predictions from one state 
of a system to another, cannot grasp the whole of nature and is necessarily limited. Ultimately, such 
systems and models of them should be regarded as abstractions that need to be contextualized, interpreted 
and made sense of by approaches that take as their starting point that scientists are products of, and active 
participants in nature and society, internal to the world composed of diverse and sometimes creative 
processes they are striving to understand. One of the most important aspects of this is the way time and 
temporality and space and spatiality are understood. Rather than temporality being regarded as an illusion 
and reduced to a dimension of space in General Relativity, temporality has to be taken as primary with 
spatiality as perhaps emergent, and space as normally conceptualized as an abstraction from such 
spatiality. ‘Now’, within which every observation is made and recorded, is centrally important, an issue 
that Smolin, (Smolin), reports bothered Einstein profoundly, for on General Relativity, in spacetime, time 
is a DIMENSION and there is no flowing time, thus NOW must be an illusion. Yet we LIVE an 
asymmetry between the relation of the present to the past and the present to the future. The future is to 
some extent open. Being situated in the present with a future to some extent open is a defining feature of 
life, including ourselves. The alliance of phenomenology and endophysics removes most of the obstacles 
to developing a rigorous non-reductive science of life. 
 
Of course this does not mean that all past biology should be jettisoned. External perspectives on living 
organisms, or exobiology, advanced through anatomy, biochemistry and molecular biology, should be 
recognized as of enormous importance; it is just that their importance can only be properly appreciated 
when developed in conjunction with an endophysical approach to life characteristic of the study of 
physiology, embryology, epigenesist, biosemiotics, emotion, sensation, intuition, and cognition, hence 
mind and meaning. The integration of phenomenology and cognitive science illustrates how external and 
internal ways of studying living phenomena can and should be combined. It is possible to interpret their 
combination as claiming that first person accounts of experience can be useful to those studying the brain 
or developing abstract models of information processing, by guiding and refining their research and the 
models they develop to characterize these. However, if the endophysics perspective is privileged, as it is 
argued here that it should be, the primary concern is to comprehend the experience of people, utilizing 
diverse studies of the brain and abstract models to deepen our understanding of such experience and to 
account for its possibility. Merleau-Ponty’s work illustrated this approach in using Goldstein’s research to 
illuminate the way people affected by brain defects actually experienced the world, in the process 
deepening our understanding of the unique way in which normal humans experience the world and how 
this facilitates their unique abilities. Following Jacob von Üexkull, who had argued that to fully 
understand organisms it is necessary to understand their surrounding worlds, physiological research 
should serve to explain the possibility of organisms being able to constitute their environments as 
surrounding worlds the way they do.  
To do full justice to life requires phenomenology and endophysics in both the broad and narrow senses. 
Viewing animals from an internalist perspective, attempting to understand their worlds as systems 
observed from the inside to understand their behavior, clearly cannot be achieved by taking an externalist 
perspective. But it is also necessary to take into account that the worlds of organisms encompass other 
organisms and their worlds, or in formal terms, the models organisms have of themselves and their 
environments must also contain the models other organisms have of themselves and their environments. 
That is, ecological systems studied by scientists consist of active components with their own 
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interpretations of these systems interacting with each other. This includes the scientists studying these 
organisms and their ecosystems. The essential point here is, understanding organisms in ecosystems 
involves appreciating that it is through one’s own experience and being embodied in and a product of the 
same world as the organisms being studied, appreciating that one’s own world is different from, but also 
in some ways similar to and intersecting the worlds of the life forms being investigated, human or 
otherwise, and that the worlds of other organisms can be comprehended. Such an approach, integrating 
phenomenology and the broad and narrow senses of endophysics, with a specific focus on life itself, can 
be characterized as ‘endobiology’. Von Üexkull’s work can be regarded as an exemplary contribution to 
this.  
Endobiology raises new issues and problems of how to integrate diverse approaches to the study of 
life. One of the most important of these is considering what role mathematics can play in biology. Once 
the view of mathematics as a universal language has been abandoned and the goal of mathematics in 
science is seen to be identifying and studying patterns that have been actualized in nature, then clearly 
there is no reason why the potential of mathematics in biology to study the patterns associated with life 
should not be recognized, with the critical caveat that the EVOLUTION OF LIFE is entailed by no law, 
and probably is not even mathematizable, (Longo et al,2012, Kauffman 2015). The work of Robert Rosen 
illustrates the role mathematics can play in modeling forms of life once they have evolved. Having 
rejected the Pythagorean/Parmenidean conception of physical existence and criticized the assumptions 
that led to it, Rosen’s main concern was to develop forms of mathematics adequate to model life. While 
initially being closely aligned with Howard Pattee and concerned to explain living process through 
nonholonomic constraints that define structure (1988), his later work in biomathematics involved 
developing mathematical models of anticipatory systems in which final causes could be modeled along 
with material, formal and efficient causes. Rosen’s primary objection to Newtonian forms of explanation 
was that the forms of entailment allowed in its mechanistic mathematical models were too impoverished 
to model all these forms of causation. A feature of these anticipatory systems, which Rosen argued is the 
defining feature of genuine complexity, is that they require a number of mathematical models to describe 
them, none of which is the largest model from which the others can be derived, while each model is a 
component of the other models.  
 Rosen’s work has stimulated other mathematicians to utilize category theory to develop mathematical 
models that can deal with scalar hierarchies, emergence and cognition. Notable is the work of Ehresmann 
and Vanbremeersch and those influenced by them on memory evolutive systems. Important as Rosen’s 
work is, it avoids the question how such anticipatory systems could emerge in the first place, or consider 
how their internal models could change with changing environments rendering their models of themselves 
defective. Furthermore, it only captures part of what von Üexkull, and following him, Merleau-Ponty 
dealt with, although work on memory evolutive systems has gone further in this regard. Models of 
systems that have models of themselves must also take into account how these systems model other 
systems with models of themselves. These issues, associated with evolution, are an added challenge to 
efforts to comprehend life. The study of evolution itself, concerned with temporal development of forms 
of life and ecosystems, further highlights the inescapable reality of temporal becoming in nature and the 
limits this places on how far life can be understood through mathematics. It highlights why it is necessary 
to give priority to endobiology over exophysics and exobiology, in both senses. It is only by 
acknowledging the priority of internalist over externalist perspectives that the distinguishing 
characteristics of life and their most important dynamics can be understood. It is said that normal humans 
have theories of the mind of the other, as do many animals, but we can get to the sixth order. Shakespeare 
seems to have gotten to the seventh order.  
Classic neo-Darwinian models of evolution are exobiological and assume that the selection forces are 
somehow given in a well defined form, independently of the temporality of the process of evolution. This 
assumes a complete description of the system in terms of a unique set of conditions and, consequently, 
that there is a unique and invariant history to explain (Kampis, 1998). It is impossible to fully explain 
evolution in this way. As George Kampis pointed out, it is only from an endobiological perspective that 
the constantly changing conditions associated with co-evolution and the transformation and even 
32 
 
replacement of whole ecosystems, along with innovative responses of organisms to such changes, can 
properly be taken into account (Kampis, 1994). Endobiology in the narrow sense is also required. It is in 
the environments produced by ecosystems that each organism can exist and interact with other organisms, 
and those who study these, are themselves the products of evolution and share this environment which is 
a facilitative or “enabling” constraint on their research. The observer is part of what is being observed, 
and this should be acknowledged. Ultimately the study of the evolution of ecosystems is the study of the 
origins and continued existence of the global ecosystem and its current regime that generated and sustains 
human life and its civilizations, including the scientific enterprise, which is now a component of this 
regime of the global ecosystem. While Rosen was developing a form of mathematics that could capture 
the complexity of entailments in living organisms, in evolution the problem is that many of the 
developments that do occur are not entailed, and this has to be acknowledged. As Stuart Kauffmann 
pointed out in an earlier work, ‘Emergence and Story: Beyond Newton, Einstein and Bohr?, it is 
impossible to prestate the configuration space of all future evolutionary possibilities. Stories are required 
to deal with such open-ended and creative complexity. This will now be looked at in more depth. 
In physics there are only happenings. Balls roll down hills. In biology we speak of “functions”. Thus, 
the function of the heart is to pump blood. But the heart makes heart sounds and jiggles water in the 
pericardial sac. Were we to ask Darwin why pumping blood is the function of my heart, he would say “It 
was selectively advantageous to your ancestors to have a heart that pumped blood”. Darwin would give a 
selective explanation most of us would accept. Note that the function of my heart is a subset of its causal 
consequences, pumping blood, not jiggling water in my pericardial sac. In physics there is no way to 
make distinctions like this among causal consequences; all are just happenings.  
We need now to try to show that the use of the term, “function” is fully legitimate in biology.  To do so 
takes a few steps. 
First, the universe has created all possible stable atoms. But has the universe created all possible 
proteins length 200 amino acids? Well, no. There are 20 kinds of amino acids and for proteins length 200 
amino acids there are 20 to the 200th power or about 10 to the 260th power, number of possible proteins 
length 200. There are 10 to the 80th particles in the known universe, which is 13.7 billion years old. Were 
all these particles making proteins length 200 on the Planck time scale of 10 to the -43 seconds, it would 
take about 10 to the 39th power times the lifetime of the universe to make all these possible proteins 
once.  
This fact is deep and physical. Above the level of atoms, the universe is vastly non-ergodic. It will not 
make most complex things, molecules, organisms, civilizations, or even rocks.  
Then “getting to exist” above the level of atoms, where the universe is non-ergodic is ‘a big deal’, 
(Kauffman 2015b). One way to exist above the level of atoms is to be a Kantian Whole, in which the parts 
exist for and by means of the whole (Kant, 1914).  A simple example that can be seen as a Kantian whole 
is a 9 peptide collectively autocatalytic set created by Wagner and Ashkenasy (Wagner and Ashkenasy). 
In this real chemical system, no peptide catalyzes its own formation. Rather, each peptide catalyses the 
formation of a second copy of the next peptide from two of that peptide’s fragments, around a catalyzed 
circle of the 9 peptides. The set is “collectively autocatalytic”. Here, as Kant would want, no part, i.e. 
peptide, catalyzes its own formation, rather each part exists, i.e. its formation is catalyzed, due to the 9 
peptide collective whole. The whole exists, due to the interacting peptide parts. The collectively 
autocatalytic set is comparable to a Kantian Whole.  
Note in passing that this peptide reproducing set proves that molecular reproduction does not require 
template reproduction of something like single stranded RNA or DNA. There is now a large literature on 
such collectively autocatalytic sets and their hoped for spontaneous emergence as one theory for the 
origin of molecular reproduction (Kauffman, 1971, 1986, 1993; Ballivet and Kauffman, 1989, 1998; 
Hordijk et al., 2012).  We hold high hopes for this theory. 
Given a collectively autocatalytic set, say peptides, in the non-ergodic universe above the level of 
atoms, we claim that we can define the function of a peptide as its role in catalyzing the formation of the 
next peptide, so its function is its “role” in sustaining the collectively autocatalytic Kantian whole. In turn, 
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if the peptide jiggles water in the petri plate, that causal consequence is a side effect and is not the 
function of the peptide. So we now can distinguish between functions and causal irrelevant side effects.  
Our next point is also important and not well stated in biology. If we consider catalyzing a reaction as a 
catalytic task, or function, the collectively autocatalytic set achieves functional closure.  All the functions 
or tasks that must be accomplished for the Kantian whole to persist existing in the universe above the 
level of atoms do get performed. An important part is missing: The set achieves functional closure, or 
“sufficiency”, “in its world”. That world beyond the, e.g. peptides, constitutes the “niche” of the Kantian 
Whole. We discuss below that we cannot define the niche independently of the collectively autocatalytic 
set, the set in its world finds functional closure and gets to exist in the universe. Functional closure is 
central in biology but usually not explicitly stated. Some discussions can be found in Moreno et al. 
(2008), Bich (2010), etc. An organism, say E. coli, is a functional whole with functional closure in its 
world, so gets to exist. We claim this is central. It is the organism as a whole in its world that undergoes 
selection. Thus, many organisms are made of DNA genes transcribed into RNA, translated into proteins, 
but the organism, say bacterium, achieves a vast functional closure of tasks in its world, by which closure 
it gets to exist in the universe above the level of atoms. Nor, we note briefly, is it easy to say what the 
functional closure is in a mixed microbial community, with lots of functional cross effects, perhaps 
“functional sufficiency” a more “open” concept, is better than “functional closure”.  Indeed, what if 
anything is the functional closure of the biosphere as a whole, or diverse parts of it such as in mixed 
microbial communities? It is this functional closure or sufficiency of the organism in its niche, of the set 
of organisms in a mixed microbial community, and the entire functionally coupled set of organisms in the 
biosphere that is evolving. We emphasize that if mind is part of the universe, and life from the start, then 
the world of any organism is partly phenomenological.  
Now let us consider just one dividing bacterium, say E. coli. It completes some vast task or functional 
closure in its world to get to divide and perhaps survive.  
We want now, (Longo et. al. 2012, Kauffman 2015b), to show that we cannot prestate the emergence 
of new functions in biological evolution. We begin in an odd way: “Here is a screw driver. Tell us all the 
uses of a screw driver.”. Try it: screw in a screw, open a can of paint, stab an assailant, scrape putty off a 
window, tie to a stick and spear a fish, rent the spear to locals and make 5% of the catch.... Do we agree 
that: i. the number of uses of a screw driver is indefinite. Next, the integers, 1,2,3, are orderable. Are the 
uses of the screw driver I just listed orderable in any natural way? No, they are just “names” of different 
uses, a nominal scale only. But if we accept these two premises, indefinite and unorderable, then no 
algorithm, or “effective procedure”, can propositionally list all the uses of a screw driver or find the next 
use. We have just shown that uses of a screw driver are not to be found algorithmically.  
Now consider an evolving bacterium, say in a new environment. All that has to happen is that some 
molecular screw driver in or on the cell “find a use” that enhances the fitness of the organism in its world, 
and with heritable variation, that new use will probably be selected by selection operating, not at the level 
of the new use of the screw driver, but at the level of the whole organism in its world, and a new function 
or use, will emerge in the evolution of the biosphere. But we cannot “prestate” this new use, or function. 
Thus, this is the arrival of the fitter, never solved by Darwin, and is also unprestatable in general.  
Such adaptations occur all the time, and are called Darwinian preadaptations such as the proposed 
evolution of feathers from thermoregulation to flight (Regal, 1975). More on such Darwinian 
preadaptations below. 
It is here that it is necessary to appreciate the significance of an internalist perspective on organisms to 
understand how adjacent possibles are sometimes explored and realized behaviorially. This involves 
exploratory behavior on the part of organisms concerned with their own survival. An instance of this was 
described by A.C. Hardy, of blue tits in Britain that discovered they could peck through the tops of milk-
bottles and devour cream. Other blue tits imitated this behavior, and manufacturers of milk-bottles 
produced thicker lids. Those blue-tits with the potential to develop stronger beaks had a competitive 
advantage, leading to blue-tits with specialist milk-bottle top penetrating beaks. What this example shows, 
as Hardy pointed out, is that evolution depends in part on the restless, exploring and perceiving animal 
that discovers new ways of living, new sources of food, just as the tits have discovered the value of the 
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milk bottles. It is adaptations which are due to the animal's behaviour,  to its restless exploration of its 
surroundings, to its initiative, and inventiveness that distinguishes the main diverging lines of evolution; it 
is these dynamic qualities which led to the different roles of life that open up to a newly emerging group 
of animals in that phase of their expansion technically known as adaptive radiation - giving the lines of 
runners, climbers, burrowers, swimmers, and conquerors of the air. (Hardy, 1965, 192). Presumably the 
blue tits were conscious, had some form of free will, and had rich phenomenology. What is it LIKE to be 
a blue tit, after all. 
 
 
But the same evolution that cannot be prestated and gives rise to new functions also includes 
morphological evolution; hence in part the classical physics of embodied organisms, as in the evolution of 
the swim bladder in some fish, where the ratio of air to water in the bladder tunes neutral buoyance in the 
water column. Paleontologists think the swim bladder evolved from the lungs of lung fish, some of which 
became partly filled with water and were poised to evolve into swim bladders. Neutral buoyancy is a 
NEW FUNCTION in the biosphere that we could not have prestated. We cannot prestate the ever new 
functionalities, hence the ever changing phase space of the evolution of the biosphere.  If we cannot 
prestate the relevant new functionalities that constitute the ever changing phase space of evolution we 
cannot write differential equations for that evolution: We do not know the relevant functional variables 
beforehand! Thus we cannot integrate the differential equations we do not have to obtain entailing laws 
for the evolution of the biosphere. Thus no law entails this evolution, (Longo eg al 2012, Kauffman 
2015b). 
Furthermore, if the niche is the boundary condition on evolution, we cannot define the niche non-
circularly from the organism which “in its niche” it achieves functional closure and gets to exist in the 
universe above the level of atoms. Thus we have no laws of motion in differential form, and even if we 
did, we have no boundary conditions by which to integrate the laws we do not have anyway; therefore no 
laws entail the evolution of the biosphere (Longo et al., 2012, Kauffman 2015b).   
This is a major negative result. Negative results drive science. Thus, the failure to show that denying 
Euclid’s parallel postulate led to non-Euclidian geometry used later by Einstein in General Relativity. The 
failure to find an analytic solution to the problem of three gravitating objects by Poincare’ led to chaos 
theory and destroyed Laplace’s claim that determinism meant predictability. Gödel’s famous 
undecidability theorem showed that mathematics is not complete. Any sufficiently complex axiom set 
generates formally undecidable statements. The negative result above, if it survives criticism, is major; it 
claims that we cannot even MATHEMATIZE the specific evolution of the biosphere. We do not know 
the functional variables that will become relevant beforehand! But the biosphere is the most or one of the 
most complex systems we know of. It seems to have become without entailing laws. If no entailing laws, 
then there can be no final theory “down there” that entails the entire becoming of the universe of which 
the biosphere is part. Sufficient reason fails, for not only do we not know what will happen, we do not 
even know what can happen. This seems true of economic life as well, where we cannot prestate 
innovations (Felin et al., 2014); hence we can have no mathematical theory of the detailed evolution of 
the economy. 
An explanatory framework beyond entailing laws: Actuals creating Adjacent Possibles 
allowing new Actuals that create new Adjacent Possibles… 
We saw that in classical physics, the boundary conditions literally create the phase space of the 
classical system, e.g. all the possible positions and momenta of the balls on the table, or N particles in a 
litre box in statistical mechanics.  
Now we have grounds to believe that no laws entail the evolution of the biosphere, and that new 
Actuals, such as the new use of the screw driver, emerge all the time in evolution. We want now to show 
that new actuals literally are new, typically unprestatable, boundary condtions, that are “enabling 
constraints” that literally create a new in the universe, hence radically emergent, Adjacent Possible phase 
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space of typically unprestatable evolutionary opportunities, in which new Actuals arise, creating yet new 
adjacent possibles.  This involves phenotypes ranging from morphological to behavioral, we can suppose, 
phenomenological.  
We begin with Darwinian preadaptations. Darwin noted that a causal consequence of a part of an 
organism of no selective use in the present environment might find a use in a different environment so be 
selected for a new use. This is the new use of the screw driver. A case is a possible evolution of swim 
bladders from the lungs of lung fish (Perry et al., 2001). Thus feathers, evolved for thermoregulation, 
were co-opted for flight, and hearing via the three middle ear bones that transmit sound, arose from the 
jaw bone of an early fish. The swim bladder, as just above, has water and air in it, whose ratio tunes 
neutral buoyancy in the water column. Paleontologists think the swim bladder evolved from the lungs of 
lung fish.  Water got into some lungs, now a sac with air and water poised to evolve into a swim bladder. 
Suppose this is correct. Did a new function arise in the biosphere? Yes, neutral buoyancy in the water 
column. Did this change the evolution of the biosphere? Yes, new species with swim bladders, new 
proteins. Could we prestate the evolution of the swim bladder? NO, it is the screw driver problem.  And: 
Once the swim bladder exits as an Actual in the biosphere, it constitutes a New Empty Niche that creates 
a new but unprestatable set of adjacent possible opportunities for evolution. For example a worm or 
bacterium but not a giraffe or large fish could evolve to live in the swim bladder. That is, the adjacent 
possible has some possibilities but not all possibilities. The next point is stunning: Presumably natural 
selection “acted” on a population of evolving lung fish to “craft” a well-functioning swim bladder. But 
did selection in any sense “act” to create the swim bladder as a new empty niche that creates new 
adjacent possibilities in evolution?  No!  So without selection acting to ‘achieve it’ the evolving biosphere 
creates its own possibilities for further evolution! We are beyond Darwin. Evolution creates, without 
selection achieving it, the very possibilities into which it becomes. If true of morphological organs such as 
the swim bladder, so almost sure is it true of behavior and “mind”; thus of the evolution of mind with 
evolved sense organs, such as the bat’s echolocation, the eagle’s sight and the dog’s smell, 2000 times as 
powerful as ours. So mind, and with it phenomenology has evolved, and done so with no entailing law, 
becoming into the possibilities that evolution created without selection achieving those possibilities. All is 
a radically emergent becoming. 
Furthermore, the swim bladder does not cause the evolution of the bacterium or worm to live in the 
swim bladder. Rather the swim bladder enables that evolution which is driven by quantum acausal 
mutations, then selection acting at the level of the whole functional closure of the organism in its world. 
Thus the swim bladder is an Actual that constitutes a boundary condition that literally, like the billiard 
table, creates a new adjacent possible phase space for evolution. But unlike the classical table boundary, 
the swim bladder is not causal, but enabling. And selection did not achieve the new adjacent possible.  
More, we do not know what is “in” the unprestatable adjacent possible in the evolution of the 
biosphere, so we do not know what can happen, and can have no measure of probability for we do not 
know the sample space. We do not know the next use of the screw driver.  Sufficient reason fails.  
Our post-Newtonian entailing law explanatory framework becomes: Actuals emerge, typically 
unprestatably and are new in the universe, unentailed by any law, boundary conditions that enable a new 
adjacent possible, but unprestatable, “set” of opportunities into which evolution “flows”, creating new 
actuals that create ever new adjacent possibles. This is, the emergent, creative, unentailed, becoming of 
the evolving biosphere, beyond law.  
In the evolution of the biosphere, probably we do not always need to consider conscious behavior. But 
we claim the same kind of becoming is true of the becoming of human life and culture and economy and 
art and civilization and history. New actuals create adjacent possible opportunities in which new Actuals 
arise in a continuous unprestatable co-creation. Consider the metaphor of improvisational comedy. The 
first rule is: Each member must accept the line given to her by the earlier member and build on it in a 
comedically appropriate way in the comedic adjacent possible. Here is the first line: “Jack, here is a silver 
platter with a steaming pile of horse…” Jack cannot say, “Take the platter back!” He can say “Oh! Where 
did you hide my cookie cutter?” This improvisation continues until the troupe creates a skit that none 
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could have prestated. In the improvisational comedy case each line is an enabling constraint that creates 
the comedic next adjacent possible.  
We claim biological evolution is the same sort of unprestatable co-creation, so is economic evolution, 
and much of cultural evolution, all beyond entailing law. So too for the becoming of emboded 
phenomenology. 
 
What is the ontological status of the Possible in Adjacent Possible? 
We have already seen that even classical physics in its boundary conditions appeals to the reality of 
counterfactual conditionals, hence to a Possible in some sense. In quantum mechanics, Heisenberg 
describes quantum coherent behavior as Potentia, (Heisenberg) and Zeh thought its possibles are real, 
(Zeh). Penrose and Hameroff, (Penrose 1989, 1994) and the Triad (Kauffman 2015b) support the 
ontological reality of the Possible. Penrose’s OR (ibid) and the Triad, (ibid), lead to a vastly participatory 
universe with consciousness and free will at each measurement event. Then there is no entailing law for 
the becoming of the universe itself, for consciousness and free will are parts of the universe. This 
panpsychism IS Endophysics and Endobiology. If Spinoza sought a monism, a single “stuff” with mental 
and physical aspects, but not causal connections between them, save God, he worked with a 17th century 
notion of matter. Quantum Mechanics opens a new door to Spinoza’s panpsychism.  
What is Science In this new Explanatory Framework? 
In a word, part of this science is historical reconstruction of what did happen in the non-ergodic 
universe above the level of atoms, e.g. paleontology and the patterns of evolution, discussed further 
below, economic history of innovations by which the economy grew from 10,000 goods and production 
functions 50,000 years ago to 10 billion goods and production functions now. If and when we can, the 
evolution of embodied phenomenology, perhaps of mind, from the origin of life to E. coli, Stentor, Hydra, 
jelly fish, bats, and us. 
Before attempting to discuss further the implications of this post entailing law explanatory framework 
for the study of evolution, we want to raise further new issues, hard to state at present. If evolution is the 
becoming via actuals that constitute enabling constraints that create ever new adjacent possibles into 
which evolution “becomes”, we need to begin to formulate what enabling constraints are, and “how” they 
create “wide” or “narrow” adjacent possibles. Moreover, evolution is co-evolution and enabling 
constraints include co-creation of enabling constraints which together create new adjacent possibles into 
which evolution becomes. We have not thought about this. Even harder, if the claims above are right, we 
do not know ahead of time what the new actuals are, or the unprestatable adjacent possibles that come 
into existence and into which evolution becomes. Post factum, the history we reconstruct, say in 
paleontology, is the history of this becoming. 
Roughly then, what kinds of single and sets of enabling constraints create what kinds of adjacent 
possibles, with lots or few possibilities, even if unprestatable? Take three prestatable cases: Tic tac toe, 
chess and Go. These are statable, because each is finite and has a finite set of legal, hence perfectly 
defined, next moves which are the adjacent possibles from each position. Clearly, tic tac toe has an 
impoverished set of adjacent possibles compared to chess and chess compared to Go. This suggests that 
even when the adjacent possible is not prestatable, some enabling constraints are richer in what they 
enable as possibilities even though at present we do not know how to “count them”. Now, organisms co-
evolve and co-create co-meshed enabling constraints in their morphological, behavioral, 
phenomenological and other evolution. In ways we do not yet understand, it seems that the explosion of 
diversity of biological species in the past 3.5 billion years and of economic goods and production 
capacities in the past 50,000 years, reflects something terribly important. In “Mind and Cosmos”, Thomas 
Nagel (2012) seeks a purposeless (having no explicit aim or goal) teleology by which “things or systems” 
tend to get more complex. The biosphere, economy and culture all exhibit this. Why? 
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Formal Cause, Beyond Formal Statable Laws, and Purposeless Teleology 
We want now to introduce the concept of formal cause. Newton mathematized Aristotle’s efficient 
cause in his laws of motion in differential equation form. If we may borrow from one of us, (Kauffman, 
1971, 1986, 1993), in 1971 Kauffman wondered about the origin of life, and did not like the idea that it 
depended on DNA or RNA template replication. What if the laws of chemistry were a bit different and 
there was no carbon with 4 bonds or nitrogen with 5 bonds, but still atoms and chemicals? Would life be 
impossible? Kauffman wanted to believe that, “of course not”. So he tried the idea that molecular 
reproduction was a collectively autocatalytic set. He made simple, mathematically formal, models of 
binary strings as model polymers, undergoing cleavage and ligation reactions, and in which each 
molecule had a probability to catalyze each reaction. Simple proofs and simulations showed that over a 
vast ensemble of reaction “graphs”, typically, as the diversity of molecules increased, the diversity of 
reactions increased even more rapidly and with some fixed probability that any molecule catalyzed any 
given reaction, at some point a collectively autocatalytic set, (CAS), would emerge spontaneously as a 
phase transition. Better theorems are now available (Hordijk et. al., 2010, 2011,2012).  And we now have 
the spontaneous formation of collectively autocatalytic sets (CASs) from libraries of halved ribozymes 
(Vaidya et al., 2012). But what is this theory? First there are no efficient causes. Second it is about 
objects, transformations among objects, and objects helping or harming those transformations. So the 
theory is independent of the material stuff and energy, and even applies to the evolution of the economy, 
where input goods and output goods are the analogues of substrates and products, the production function 
is the analogue of the reaction, and the tool that carries out the production function is the analogue of the 
catalyst.  
We want to call such a theory that is independent of the specific “stuff”, a Formal Cause Law. Here, 
moreover, it is ‘generic” in a vast ensemble of systems of objects, transformations of objects and objects 
helping or hindering those transformations that “collectively autocatalytic sets” arise. This spontaneous 
emergence at a sufficient diversity of objects, transformations among objects and objects mediating the 
transformations, is a form of Nagel’s concept of purposeless teleology by which complexity increases, but 
without a guiding purpose (Nagel, 2012). Complexity begets more complexity (Hanel et al., 2005). But as 
stated, the “enabling constraints” are not stated. Well in classical chemistry, the enabling constraints are 
the allowed reactions among the set of molecules, and the probability of catalysis. In the economy, the 
constraints are enabling in a related sense, but seem not to be formalizable! What can this screw driver 
and that hammer be together used for that may be of value? To return to the screw driver: A fine use of 
the screw driver is to prop it against a wall, sharp edge perpendicular to wall, prop a piece of plywood on 
top of the screw driver and place a wet oil painting under the plywood to keep it out of the rain. One 
might even sell this silly contraption creating a new business. This example makes the point and puzzle. 
Somehow the screw driver is an enabling constraint on what it can be used for alone or with other things 
or processes, for some function in an organism, or purpose or function in our personal or economic lives. 
But we cannot “say” ahead of time what a given “object” or “process”, alone or with others, enables. This 
means that a hoped for formal cause law, such as the theory of the spontaneous emergence of collectively 
autocatalytic sets or new sectors of an economy, cannot really be formalized for we cannot even “count” 
the number of uses of a screw driver alone or with other things, such what can we use in a formal theory 
of e.g. nodes and arrows, where the arrows each point out from a node and depict what the node 
“enables”, when we cannot say how many arrows should point outward from each node?! What exists, the 
Actuals, find unprestatable uses that constitute, if “selected” in evolution, or acted upon by the innovating 
entrepreneur, new morphologies, new ways organisms “make a living” in their worlds, and new 
businesses. We have more even than the phase transition in formalizable models (Hanel et al., 2005) of 
the purposeless teleology Nagel (2012) seeks. We cannot even count the “connectivity” of the enablement 
graph, at least once we consider all the parts of organisms, organisms, ecosystems, the biosphere, 
economies, legal laws, and culture.  
We need a theory beyond formal causes, beyond that which is stateable, and hence is not obviously 
formalizable mathematically, as far as we can see, in the uses and richness of webs of enabling constraints 
38 
 
and that enable poor or rich adjacent possibles into which life becomes. Nagel’s intuited purposeless 
teleology (Nagel, 2012) seems right: more complexity of things and processes and laws and behaviors 
enable ever new and yet richer adjacent possibles into which the biosphere and human life become. We 
do not yet recognize the potentially enormous power of this often unstatable emerging adjacent possibles, 
the very opportunities evolution creates morphologically and behaviorally for itself, the very 
opportunities the evolving economy, governmental structures, laws, regulations and enabled behaviors, 
strategies, that create yet new adjacent possible opportunities into which we become. If so, and for human 
life if we cannot know what we enable, how do we do so wisely? How in human life do we garden the 
partially unprestatable and unintended adjacent possibles into which we become, flowering or 
metastasizing? As for embodied phenomenology, is not the discovery of a new use of a screw driver in a 
context in some sense phenomenological? The becoming of mathematics, number to calculus to topology 
are emergent crystals of pure creativity, part of our phenomenology. If so, there is no fixed content to 
human phenomenology. 
 
Patterns of Evolution of Life and Mind 
If we can have no entailing laws for the detailed evolution of the biosphere, life and mind, can we use 
the ideas above to help look for patterns in evolution? We hope so. We mention only a few cases. 1) The 
distribution of species per genus, genera per family, up the higher taxa, can and has been studied. The 
statistical features of these distributions tell us what the exploration and exploitation of the enabled 
adjacent possibles have been in real evolution. Given this branching history, it seems very worthwhile to 
attempt now to examine each case and try to tease out what were the actuals in one or many interacting 
species in their joint world(s) that enabled each new species to arise at the morphological and behavioral 
level. 2) If Nagel’s purposeless teleology (Nagel), is right (Bickhard, 2001), as complexity and diversity 
of processes and “stuffs”, grow, it becomes easier to both create richer adjacent possibles and “discover” 
new ways to enter these enriched adjacent possibles at morphological and behavioral levels. In the 
economy, for example, was it easier to invent something new 50,000 years ago or today? Obviously, 
today. Why? We now have so many goods and production capacities that it is easy to find new uses for 
these, and new combinations of existing goods and production functions that can be put to new uses. The 
economic history of technologies is a fine case in point. We can reconstruct what happened. The printing 
press put the wine press to a new use. Behind this invention is human phenomenology. Complexity is 
itself autocatalytic, but unprestatable, at and after the origin of life and its becoming. 3) The distribution 
of extinction events is, statistically a power law. Theories such as self-organized criticality are one formal 
cause attempt to explain this (Longo et al., 2012). So too are Schumpeterian gales of creative destruction 
in the economy apparently a power law, perhaps explained by formal cause analogues to self-organized 
criticality (Hanel et al., 2007). If so, criticality may be an emergent unentailed law for functional 
organization across scales in the evolving biosphere and economy, morphological, technological, mind 
and phenomenology welded together.  
Conclusion 
In a sense, what is written here is known-in-the-bones by working evolutionary biologists and in many 
senses; we intuitively feel that Darwinian evolution is not derivable from entailing laws and carry out our 
evolutionary studies with confidence, without seeking such entailing laws. We cannot derive what 
selection, acting at the level of the whole organism in its world, will “select” among the possible but 
unprestatable “uses of screw drivers” that may happen to be new uses that enhance the fitness of the 
organism in its world, so heritable variation may be selected. If we cannot close evolutionary theory, the 
world, at least living world, is vastly different from the dreams of a final entailing theory of the cosmos, 
as Weinberg hoped. The biosphere is part of the universe, and if its becoming is not logically entailed, 
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then neither is that of the universe. This accords with the interpretation of quantum theory offered here, in 
which the measurement process involving some degree of freedom to choose what is measured, is 
recognized to influence what is measured, and this is seen as only a particular instance in the ‘choices’ 
that are ubiquitous in nature. The future is to some degree open, and in choosing what to measure, 
systems are participating and influencing what possibilities will be realized.   
If the biosphere and the cosmos are creative in this way, the faith of biologists that ultimately, 
reductionist explanations that reduce organisms to chemistry and physics must eventually succeed, is 
completely misplaced. There is no reason to assume this at all; on the contrary, there is every reason to 
accord proper recognition of the unique features of life that have emerged in the creative becoming of 
nature, and to recognize that it is essential to acknowledge the openness of this becoming. Not only is it 
necessary to appreciate that each organism, including protozoa and plants, have worlds that have meaning 
for them to which they respond accordingly. It is necessary to recognize that these worlds are to some 
extent open and that organisms to survive have to confront and deal with this openness. In doing so they 
can realize new possibilities that had never before been realized, or even envisaged. This is evident in 
Hardy’s observation and insight that evolution depends on the restless exploring activity of animals which 
discovered new uses for what was available to them in their struggle for life.  
       But the same is true in economic evolution as seen in the evolution of our technologies which emerge 
into the very adjacent possibilities they and we, often unknowingly, co-create. The Turing machine led to 
the von Neumann universal computer, to IBM main frames, then with the chip to personal computers that 
led to word processing, sharing files, thence the WEB, and selling on the web and social media, that 
played a role in the Arabic Spring and the metastasis of Eisenhower’s Military Industrial Complex to the 
US’s NSA spying on its and many global citizens. We too become, for better or worse and must learn to 
garden the adjacent possibles we co-create but cannot fully prestate. 
Endophysics and endobiology (endoscience with life and mind), have to be recognized as more basic 
than exophysics and exobiology (exoscience), and must be given far larger precedence in defining 
scientific truth. What the above analyses of quantum theory and evolutionary theory show is that we are 
participants in the phenomena being studied. That we as conscious, embodied beings are part of what we 
are studying means that such research is reflection upon ourselves and the conditions of our existence. It 
is in a sense, introspection. Apart from measurement, the boundary conditions used in exophysics setting 
constraints are also part of nature, and only a very small number of the constraints that are operative in 
making science possible. There are also the constraints of being a living organism that has evolved and 
grown into a human form able to participate in society, culture and the enterprise of science. The 
‘interpolation’ of new constraints is central both to evolution and the development of particular 
organisms, and are not entailed by their antecedent conditions (Salthe, 1985, 145; 1993, ch.2; 2012). 
Among the most important of these are the various facilitative constraints that transform physical 
structures or events into signs through which organisms are able to remember and anticipate, and 
communicate. It is through these that organisms constitute and interpret their environments as their 
surrounding worlds, and explore their possibilities. This makes the study of the evolution of the biosphere 
endoscientific in another sense. It is the study of a system with components that are themselves agents 
interpreting the system of which they are part and acting on the basis of their interpretations. Since as we 
have seen, this can involve identifying new possibilities, putting objects to new uses or establishing new 
relations (for instance, symbiotic relations involving further emergent constraints and possibilities) this 
also makes it impossible to produce a predictive model of evolution. Any predictive model will only be 
an approximation of some limited domain of evolution with limited applicability.  
It is in endobiology that endophysics converges and unites with naturalized phenomenology. 
Endophysics examines systems with active participants in which the future is not entirely determined by 
the past. Phenomenology, on the other hand, is primarily concerned to elucidate the nature of human 
being-to-the-world, as Merleau-Ponty characterized human being. In doing so phenomenologists are 
clarifying all dimensions of this, including the experience of embodiment in nature and society, the 
temporality and spatiality of the experienced world, relations to others of various kinds, human and non-
human, the different domains of experience and their relationship to each other, what is involved in using 
40 
 
language, being involved in various forms of communication and expressing oneself, the nature of 
emotional engagement and detachment, the sense of an identity and the loss of it, the experience of 
meaning in our lives and loss of meaning, in thinking practically and theoretically and what is involved in 
making decisions, acting individually and collectively, and facing up to our mortality. Phenomenology is 
relevant to understanding the highest cultural achievements of humanity and their significance, including 
art, mathematics and science. Such work almost inevitably led to investigations into the experience of 
others and efforts to understand their experience, particularly when these others are very different to 
ourselves. Phenomenology has proved immensely fruitful in psychology and psychiatry, making sense of 
the behavior of people who appear to be acting irrationally and unpredictably (Spiegelberg, 1972). 
Despite Husserl’s concerns, phenomenology lends itself to the development of philosophical biology and 
the study of non-human organisms to elucidate their worlds. Through such studies, taken for granted 
assumptions, embedded in most people’s experience, have been exposed and brought into question, 
revealing new possibilities of experience.   
However, there are many aspects of nature that cannot be understood through phenomenology, and as 
Merleau-Ponty and the naturalized phenomenologists have argued, phenomenology should be conjoined 
with other forms of enquiry. With endoscience, this can be work very similar to that of the 
phenomenologists, such as that of the biosemioticians developing the ideas of Peirce, von Uexküll, 
Saussure and Cassirer. Some theories of cognition are similar to phenomenological studies of perception 
without being influenced by them, and each can illuminate the other. Mathematical models of life or 
cognition cannot capture the experience of being alive (stories are far better for evoking appreciation of 
this), but are important for illuminating some aspects of life. With exoscience, for instance the study of 
chemical reactions in the brain, what is isolated and studied can appear to have nothing in common with 
lived experience, and yet still be important for understanding human consciousness. In all instances, what 
is required is a dialect between exoscience, endophysics and phenomenology, using each to correct or 
challenge the others. It should be borne in mind that modern chemistry is based on the notion of valence, 
with chemicals seen as existing as balances between opposing forces, an idea put forward at the end of the 
eighteenth century by Friedrich Schelling who argued that given the reality of life and mind, nature could 
not possibly be made up of inert bits of matter.  
Ultimately, as Merleau-Ponty argued, this dialect should illuminate what it is to be engaged in 
scientific work and developing such knowledge. Here the experience and consciousness of the scientist is 
absolutely central. Every scientific inquiry, every theory and model and every bit of evidence, no matter 
how distant from directly comprehending experience and consciousness, has to be made sense of by 
scientists. They themselves have to appreciate that they are conscious beings embodied and socially 
situated, participating in the process of becoming of science, and it is only by virtue of this that they can 
advance knowledge. In turn, their work is part of the process by which humans are coming to understand 
themselves and their place in nature, and the immense significance this could have for the becoming of 
society and of nature. Emotion, (Peil), which, as the phenomenologists have argued, is an aspect of living 
beings appreciating the significance of their own and others’ existence, the openness of the future and the 
potential of their decisions to affect the future, is also central to the restless exploring and drive for 
comprehension of scientists. Its reality and importance also should be understood by them as aspect of 
their self knowledge and knowledge of nature. 
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